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The Cross at College: Accommodation and Acknowledgment of Religion at Public Universities
Ira C. Lupu and Robert W. Tuttle1
Forthcoming in Volume 16, William and Mary Bill of Rights Journal (2008)
Part I: Introduction
In October 2006, President Gene Nichol of the College of William & Mary ordered a
change in the practice of displaying a cross in the college’s Wren Chapel.2 Since the late 1930s,
when Bruton Parish Church donated the cross to the college, the cross normally had been
1
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Lupu is the F. Elwood & Eleanor Davis Professor of Law; Robert W. Tuttle is a Professor of
Law and the David R. and Sherry Kirschner Berz Research Professor of Law and Religion. The
authors are also Co-Directors of Legal Research for the Roundtable on Religion and Social
Welfare Policy, a nonpartisan enterprise sponsored by the Pew Charitable Trusts and operated by
the Nelson A. Rockefeller Institute on State and Local Government, State University of New
York. The views expressed in this Article are those of the authors, and do not necessarily reflect
the views of the Pew Charitable Trusts or the Rockefeller Institute. The authors are very grateful
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Andrew Petkofsky, W & M president reiterates reasons for cross removal, Richmond

Times Dispatch, Nov. 17, 2006, at B-1. Email from President Nichol to Students of William &
Mary, Oct. 27, 2006 (copy on file with authors and law review); message from President Nichol
to William & Mary Board of Visitors, Nov. 16, 2006, available at
http://www.wm.edu/news/index.php?id=7026.
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displayed on the chapel’s altar and removed only for secular events or non-Christian worship.3
The brass cross stands 18 inches tall and is inscribed “IHS,” which represents the name “Jesus
Christ.”4 Nichol concluded that permanent display of the cross on the altar treated non-Christian
members of the college community as outsiders.5 He directed that the cross should be removed
from the display in the chapel except during “appropriate religious services.”6
On campus and beyond, the decision sparked an intense controversy.7 Opponents
charged that the decision reflected hypersensitivity to those who were allegedly offended by the

3

Vince Haley, Save the Wren Chapel: An astounding bit of blabber from the president of

William and Mary, National Review Online (Nov. 17, 2006), available at
http://article.nationalreview.com/?q=NTk3Njc2MWM5OWNjZmY3MmNjYzUzMGJiNjZlZWF
iY2E=; Susan Godson, History of the Wren Cross (Nov. 11, 2006) (copy on file with authors and
law review).
4

See picture of cross, available at http://www.flathatnews.com/news/102/nichol-defends-

cross-removal-at-bov-meeting
5

Nichol, Message to Board of Visitors, supra note 2. See also Gene R. Nichol,

Balancing tradition and inclusion: Behind W&M's cross controversy, The Virginian-Pilot
(Norfolk, Va.), Dec. 24, 2006, at J1; Petkofsky, supra note 2.
6

Nichol, Message to Board of Visitors, supra note 2.

7

Fredrick Kunkle, Upset About Cross's Removal, William and Mary Alumni Mount

Online Protest, The Washington Post, Dec. 26, 2006, at B1; Shawn Day, Wren cross feud waged
on Web, Daily Press (Newport News, VA), June 21, 2007.
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display, and effectively sacrificed the tradition of the college to “political correctness.”8 Some
claimed that Nichol’s decision represented hostility to Christianity, or even to religion in general,
by attempting to erase the chapel’s spiritual heritage.9 Alumni of the college drafted and
circulated a petition – which eventually gathered well over ten thousand signatures – asking that
the decision be reversed.10 Several opponents publicly asked for Nichol’s resignation, and one
8

George Harris, The Bishop, the Statesman, and the Wren Cross: a lesson in American

secularism, 67:4 The Humanist 37 (July 1, 2007) (describing arguments of opponents of
President Nichol’s decision); Natasha Altamirano, Bow to diversity leaves altar empty; William
& Mary removes cross from ‘equally open’ Wren Chapel, The Washington Times, Jan. 29, 2007,
at A1; Wren Cross: Compromise Is Not Enough, The Regent’s Voice, Jan. 13, 2007, available at
http://regentsvoice.blogspot.com/2007/01/wren-cross-compromise-is-not-enough.html.
9

Haley, supra note 3; Will Coggin, Does President Nichol's Agenda Call for Secularizing

College? Richmond Times Dispatch, Dec. 18, 2006, at A-9; Matthew D. Staver, Cross of
William and Mary, campusreportonline.net (Dec. 5, 2006), available at
http://www.campusreportonline.net/main/articles.php?id=1372; see also letter from Erik W.
Stanley, Liberty Counsel, to Gene Nichol, College of William & Mary (Dec. 1, 2006), available
at http://lc.org/attachments/ltr_wm_mary_cross_120106.pdf (arguing that removal of cross from
altar of Wren Chapel reflects hostility to Christianity).
10

Fredrick Kunkle, Cross Returns to Chapel – But Not on the Altar, The Washington

Post, Mar. 7, 2007, at B6 (17,000 signatures on petition). The petition was located on a website
that has since been discontinued, www.savethewrencross.org. An archived copy of the petition
may be found online at
3

donor revoked a large pledge to the college.11 An outraged alumnus even filed a lawsuit
challenging the removal of the cross.12
In response to this outpouring of criticism, Nichol appointed a Committee on Religion at
a Public University to study the questions raised by the ongoing controversy over the chapel.13
http://web.archive.org/web/20070702051241/www.savethewrencross.org/petition.php; Kunkle,
supra note 7.
11

Andrew Petkofsky, W & M donor cancels pledge, cites Wren cross; Loss of $10

million donation sets back college fundraising campaign, Richmond Times Dispatch, Mar. 1,
2007, at A1; W&M takes comments on Nichol’s performance, Richmond Times Dispatch, Sept.
9, 2007, at B8. Opponents of Nichol have a website, on which they argue for his removal. See
ShouldNicholBeRenewed.org. See also Karla Bruno, Request to BOV - William and Mary
deserves better, April 11, 2007, available at
http://savethewrencross.blogspot.com/2007/04/request-to-bov-let-gene-nichol.html
12

Leach v. Nichol, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38763 (E.D. Va., May 29, 2007), affirmed,

2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 27857 (4th Cir., Dec. 3, 2007). Carol Scott, W & M grad sues for cross’
permanent return: A scholar said a First Amendment lawsuit against the College of William and
Mary would be frivolous, Daily Press (Newport News, Va.), Feb. 13, 2007; Shawn Day, Judge
dismisses Wren Cross lawsuit, Daily Press (Newport News, Va.), June 20, 2007.
13

Bill Geroux, W&M will revisit debate on cross: Nichol wants group to explore role of

religion in public universities, Richmond Times-Dispatch, January 26, 2007. Details about the
William and Mary Committee on Religion at a Public University are available online, at
http://www.wm.edu/committee_on_religion/
4

The committee, comprised of faculty, students, and alumni of the college, eventually
recommended a compromise solution. The cross would be returned to permanent display in the
chapel, but the cross would not be placed on the chapel altar except on Sundays or during
Christian worship services.14 At all other times, the cross would be located in a glass case and
accompanied by a plaque describing the historical significance of the chapel and cross. Nichol
and the school’s Board of Visitors embraced the compromise, and many opponents seemed to
accept the resolution.15 The now-encased cross is located toward the front of the chapel, against
the side wall and just outside the chancel rail. In this location, the cross is barely visible to those
who enter through the chapel’s narthex, although it can be easily seen from the front of the
nave.16
The controversy over the Wren Chapel cross provides an especially useful prism for
14

Joint Statement of the Board of Visitors and the President, Mar. 6, 2007, available at

http://www.wm.edu/committee_on_religion/statements/bovpresmar6.php
15

Id.; Kunkle, supra note 7; Andrew Petkofsky, W&M to return cross to chapel: Panel's

compromise restores Wren cross, welcomes other religious objects for display, Richmond
Times-Dispatch, Mar. 7, 2007; Natasha Altamirano, Return of cross quiets debate at William &
Mary, The Washington Times, Mar. 8, 2007, at B1; Statement by Save the Wren Cross Website,
available at
http://web.archive.org/web/20070702051010/www.savethewrencross.org/stwcstatement.php.
16

Bill Geroux, Wren Cross is returned to William and Mary chapel: In a compromise, it's

now in a display case bearing a plaque, Richmond Times-Dispatch, Aug. 4, 2007. The narthex is
the entrance area furthest from the altar; the nave is the section in which the congregation sits.
5

exploring three facets of contemporary Establishment Clause law, all of which figured
prominently in the arguments about removal of the cross. After a brief sketch in Part II of
relevant portions of the College’s history, including its transition from a private college to a state
institution, we turn to the three facets of Establishment Clause jurisprudence illuminated by the
dispute. Part III addresses the foundational question of that jurisprudence – against what type of
injury or injuries does the Establishment Clause protect? President Nichol defended his decision
in terms of concern for those who might feel excluded by display of the cross. Opponents argued
that such feelings of exclusion are not the kind of injuries that deserve attention or redress.
Because students could have the cross removed for particular events, and the university never
required any student to use the chapel, display of the cross injured no one.
These rival positions on injury closely track the two dominant positions in the
contemporary law of the Establishment Clause law. These competing positions were on display
most recently and importantly in Hein v. Freedom from Religion Foundation,17 the Supreme
Court’s decision limiting taxpayer standing to bring suit under the clause. As the Wren Chapel
controversy amply illustrates, the emphasis on individualized injury in Establishment Clause
discourse seriously misconstrues key elements of the clause’s history, doctrine, and normative
focus. Although the clause has a role to play in protecting individual religious liberty, it has an
equally or more important role as a structural limitation on government jurisdiction over religion,
including the authority to promote religion.
17

127 S.Ct. 2553 (2007). For our analysis of Hein, see Ira C. Lupu and Robert W. Tuttle,

Ball on a Needle: Hein v. Freedom from Religion Foundation, Inc. and the Future of
Establishment Clause Adjudication, 2007 B.Y.U. L. Rev. ____ (forthcoming).
6

The remainder of the paper explores how that structural limitation should be applied in
the context of the display of the Wren Chapel cross. In Part IV, we assess the first of the two
theories that might support at least some version of the continued display of the Wren Chapel
cross. Drawing on a rich and complex theme in Establishment Clause jurisprudence, opponents
of the President’s decision asserted that public display of the cross did not favor Christianity, but
simply “accommodated” the religious needs of Christian students. This assertion highlights
uncertainties about how Establishment Clause standards should be applied to public universities,
and in particular to chapel and chaplaincy programs in those institutions. In some settings, such
as healthcare facilities and the military, government enjoys constitutional discretion to facilitate
private religious experience. But that discretion is bounded. Government conduct that purports
to accommodate religion nonetheless may violate the Establishment Clause if such facilitation
affirmatively promotes the practice of one or more faiths, or imposes unnecessary burdens on
those who do not participate in the accommodated religious activity. Viewed in light of the
Supreme Court’s criteria for assessing permissible accommodations of religion, the university’s
support for the chapel itself is defensible, but the traditional Wren Chapel cross display on the
chapel’s altar would be open to serious challenge. As we explain in this Part, display of the
Wren Chapel cross on the altar as a default position – in that place unless special reason exists to
temporarily displace it – confers a special privilege on one faith and does not alleviate a
discernible religious burden on Christian students. The theory of religious accommodation thus
does not support opponents of the President’s decision.
In Part V, we turn to the second theory that might support continued display of the cross
– the claim that government may “acknowledge” religion without running afoul of the
7

Establishment Clause. The claim invokes the Supreme Court’s opinions on public display of
religious images and messages, under which the Court has approved religious messages within
holiday displays and other monuments as long as such messages reflect governmental
“acknowledgment of our religious heritage,”18 rather than positive endorsement of the religious
content of the messages. Those who opposed the change asserted that the cross’s prior location
on the chapel’s altar acknowledged the role of Christianity, and especially the Anglican tradition,
in the history of the college.
As we explain in this Part, the claim of acknowledgment typically encompasses a variety
of distinct, though rarely separated, elements. The idea of acknowledgment can be disentangled
into three discrete strands – historical accuracy, reverence, and cultural recognition. Until quite
recently, the Supreme Court’s opinions had not called attention to the multiplicity of meanings
inherent in the concept of acknowledgment, but Justice Scalia’s dissent in ACLU of Kentucky v.
McCreary County19 has now brought this ambiguity to the forefront of debates over the
Establishment Clause. The Wren Chapel cross controversy provides a particularly useful setting
for exploring and clarifying distinctions among the strands. We argue that the concept of
acknowledgment as historical accuracy poses relatively few problems under the Establishment
Clause, but the Wren Chapel cross, when placed upon the altar, has little claim to historical
provenance within the chapel. The concept of acknowledgment as reverence could provide a
sufficient basis for permanent placement of the cross on the Wren Chapel altar, but this
interpretation of “acknowledgment” has little support in present Establishment Clause doctrine,
18

Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 677 (1984).

19

545 U.S. 844, 855-912 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
8

and even the most ambitious account of reverential acknowledgment would not permit display of
a specific tradition’s sacred symbol. Therefore, acknowledgment as reverence provides
supporters of that placement with no basis for their position. Finally, acknowledgment as
cultural recognition provides a slightly more plausible explanation for continued display of the
Wren Chapel cross, but this version of acknowledgment demands a plausible secular justification
for display of religious images, and we do not believe such a justification can be given for
permanent display of the cross on the Wren Chapel altar.
Ultimately, we argue that the compromise agreement reached by the President, Board of
Visitors, and Committee on Religion is more than simply a pragmatic settlement of a contentious
question. This agreement manifests the concept of acknowledgment as historical accuracy, while
simultaneously attesting to the Establishment Clause’s limits on government promotion of a
particular faith.

Part II: Background – Religion and the Role of the State in the College of William & Mary
The controversy over the Wren Chapel cross reflects a serious debate over the present
role of religion in a public university. The College of William and Mary’s 1693 charter,20
however, suggested no uncertainty about the importance of religion in that institution’s founding.
The charter, granted by King William III and Queen Mary II of England, identified three

20

The Charter of the College of William and Mary, in The History of the College of

William and Mary From Its Foundation, 1660, to 1874 (Richmond, Va.: J.W. Randolph &
English, 1874), 3-16.
9

purposes for the college.21 First, it would supply ministers to the Church of England in Virginia.
Second, it would provide a place “that the youth may be piously educated in good letters and
manners.” Third, it would spread the Gospel among the “Western Indians.”22
The 1693 charter is illuminating for many reasons, but especially because it so clearly
demonstrates the union of religion and government after the Glorious Revolution.23 In the
charter’s provisions, the crown asserted responsibility over the religious education and spiritual
welfare of its citizens, as well as the spread of Christianity to nonbelievers. The concern for
“propagation of the gospel” pervades the charter, and appears in virtually every discussion of the

21

Id. at par. 1. See also Wilford Kale, Hark Upon the Gale: An Illustrated History of the

College of William and Mary (Norfolk, Va.: The Donning Co., 1985), 17.
22

Charter, supra note 20, at par. 2.

23

See generally Hugh Trevor-Roper, Toleration and Religion after 1688, in From

Persecution to Toleration, ed. O. Grell, J. Israel, and N. Tyacke (Oxford, 1991); Carl H. Esbeck,
Dissent and Disestablishment: The Church-State Settlement in the Early American Republic,
2004 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 1385, 1412-14 (the Church of England during the reign of William and
Mary); Michael W. McConnell, Establishment and Disestablishment at the Founding, Part I:
Establishment of Religion, 44 Wm. and Mary L. Rev. 2105, 2160-61 (2003); Joel A. Nichols,
Religious Liberty in the Thirteenth Colony: Church-State Relations in Colonial and Early
National Georgia, 80 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1693, 1707-08 (2005); Laura Zwicker, Note: The Politics
of Toleration: The Establishment Clause and the Act of Toleration Examined, 66 Ind. L.J.
773,773-783 (1991).
10

content of instruction at the college.24
Moreover, the charter promised substantial royal subsidies for the college. In addition to
a direct payment for the construction of the college,25 the charter assigned to the college revenues
from a portion of the tax on tobacco exports from Virginia and Maryland,26 as well as rents from
certain royal lands.27 The charter also conferred on the college the office of royal surveyor in
Virginia, which carried the right to collect fees from those – including, in 1747, George
Washington – it licensed to conduct surveys in the colony.28
Finally, the unity of church and state are most fully expressed in the charter’s provisions
for governance of the college. The document granted authority over the school to an
independent body,29 originally functioning as trustees and later as a corporate board, which was
24

Charter, supra note 20; see especially preamble & par. 1. On the College of William &

Mary and the Anglican establishment, see George M. Marsden, The Soul of the American
University: From Protestant Establishment to Established Nonbelief (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1994), at 54.
25

Id. at par. 14.

26

Id. at par. 15.

27

Id. at par. 17.

28

Id. at par. 16. On Washington’s licensing by the college, see Kale, supra note 21, at

29

The charter granted the original powers to trustees who held property for the college

44.

until the college was sufficiently well established to possess a separate legal identity. At that
point, in 1729, the trustees transferred ownership of the property to the college, and a board of
11

empowered to make regulations for the school, provided such regulations did not conflict with
the laws of the realm, “or to the canons and constitutions of the church of England, by law
established.”30 The initial trustees were elected by Virginia’s general assembly, and included the
Lieutenant Governor of the colony, Francis Nicholson, and James Blair, the Bishop of London’s
representative (“commissary”) in Virginia.31 In addition to the authority granted to the visitors,
visitors was elected to exercise governance in the name of the college. See The Transfer of the
College of William and Mary, in The History of the College of William and Mary From Its
Foundation, 1660, to 1874 (Richmond, Va.: J.W. Randolph & English, 1874), 17-33 (formal
document transferring control of the college from the trustees to a board of visitors); Parke
Rouse, Jr., A House for a President: 250 Years on the Campus of the College of William and
Mary (Richmond, Va.: The Dietz Press, 1983), 12. The board of visitors, as specified in the
charter, functioned as a self-perpetuating body until the college became a state institution in
1907, at which point the Governor of Virginia received authority to name visitors. Rouse, 15455.
30

Charter, supra note 20, at par. 9.

31

Blair and Nicholson were the most important figures in establishment of the college.

James D. Kornwolf, “So Good a Design” The Colonial Campus of the College of William and
Mary” Its History, Background, and Legacy (Williamsburg, Va.: The College of William and
Mary, 1989), 13-22. As commissary, Blair was the most powerful ecclesiastical official in the
colony because the Church of England did not have a bishop serving in the colony – indeed, no
bishop served anywhere in North America. Instead, the parishes in the colonies came under the
jurisdiction of the Bishop of London. Kale, supra note 21, at 21-22.
12

the charter gave the college’s president and faculty a specifically political right – the power to
select a representative in the general assembly.32
Blair, a Scots-born clergyman then serving in Henrico parish, was named the first
president of the college, “during his natural life,” as well as first rector (or chair) of the trustees.33
He served as president for fifty years, until his death in 1743. Blair, like six presidents who
would follow him, also held the rectorate of Bruton Parish Church during his tenure in office,
and continued his position as commissary of the Bishop of London.34 In addition, Blair,
followed by four of his pre-Revolutionary successors as president, served on the Governor’s
Council, which combined judicial, administrative, and legislative functions within the colony.35
Work on the college’s main building, now called the Sir Christopher Wren Building,
commenced soon after the charter was granted, although it was not ready for use until 1700. An
early 18th-century source attributed the building to the famous architect Sir Christopher Wren,36
and although the evidence for the attribution is scant, arguments for Wren’s involvement in the
32

Charter, supra note 20, at par. 18.

33

Charter, supra note 20, at par. 3.

34

Three of Blair’s five successors before the American Revolution also held the position

of commissary (William Dawson, Thomas Dawson, and John Camm). Rouse, supra note 29, at
21-73. See also Harold Wickliffe Rose, The Colonial Houses of Worship in America: Built in
the English Colonies Before the Republic, 1607-1789, and Still Standing (New York: Hastings
House, 1963), 15-16 (on the role of commissary); 455 (on college presidents at Bruton Parish).
35

Id.

36

Kornwolf, supra note 31, at 44-45.
13

design are at least plausible.37 The college was originally planned as a quadrangle, but a
shortage of funds limited construction to only two sides, the east range – the main classroom and
residence quarters – and the north wing, which contained the Great Hall.38
In 1699, the Virginia General Assembly solidified William & Mary’s union between
church and state when it decided to relocate the colonial capital from Jamestown to the new site
of the college, previously called Middle Plantation but now renamed Williamsburg.39 Loss of
the previous capitol building to fire prompted the decision, and from 1700-1705 the general
assembly met in the Great Hall of the college while a new capitol was under construction.40 The
legislature would return to the college from 1747-1753, while the new capitol was rebuilt after
another fire.41
Although King William and Queen Mary granted the charter in 1693, and a grammar
school began operation soon thereafter, the college did not hire any professors until twenty years
later.42 This delay was caused at least in part by a 1705 fire that destroyed the college building.43
37

Id. at 29-35, 44-49; Kale, supra note 21, at 27-28.

38

The south wing, containing the chapel, was completed in 1732; the west range was

never completed. Kale, supra note 21, at 29, 41; Kornwolf, supra note 31, at 36-56; Rouse,
supra note 29, at 10, 12-13.
39

Kale, supra note 21, at 29.

40

Id. at 31.

41

Id. at 44.

42

Lyon C. Tyler, Early Courses and Professors at William and Mary College, Address to

the Phi Beta Kappa Society, William and Mary College, Williamsburg, Va. (Dec. 5, 1904), at 1.
14

Reconstruction did not begin in earnest until 1710 and was not completed until 1716.44 By the
1720s, however, the college had gained sufficient momentum that President Blair arranged for
construction of the college’s south wing, which contained the chapel.45 The building was
completed and the chapel consecrated in 1732.46
Between the 1720s and the 1770s, the college maintained its close bond with the Church
of England. As required by the college’s regulations, all presidents of the college during this
period were ordained clergy of the Church of England, and most faculty were as well.47 Bishops
of London served as chancellors of the school.48 The divinity school operated during this period,
although it apparently failed to generate a significant number of new clergy for the church;
See also Kale, supra note 21, at 35.
43

Kale, supra note 21, at 31, Kornwolf, supra note 31, at 43-44. See also Historical

Sketch of the College of William and Mary in Virginia, in The History of the College of William
and Mary From Its Foundation, 1660, to 1874 (Richmond, Va.: J.W. Randolph & English, 1874),
34-69, at 40.
44

Kale, supra note 21, at 35. An Indian school also operated at college after 1712. Id. at

37-39. Like the divinity school, enrollment in the Indian school appears not to have matched
expectations.
45

Id. at 41; Rouse, supra note 29, at 12.

46

Kale, supra note 21, at 41; Historical Sketch, supra note 43, at 41, 43; Rouse, supra

note 29, at 12.
47

Kale, supra note 21, at 41.

48

Rouse, supra note 29, at 225 (Appendix I, listing chancellors of the college).
15

records indicate that fewer than forty graduates of the divinity school received ordination.49
The American Revolution brought dramatic changes to the college because both England
and the Anglican Church withdrew support. The crown ended its substantial funding of the
college, leaving the school with only the rent from relatively unproductive land, along with the
office of surveyor, which the college seems to have retained well into the 19th century.50 Once
among the wealthiest of institutions in the colonies, the college was reduced to an annual budget
of around a tenth of its former income.51 The new government of Virginia provided little help,
and its decision in 1780 to move the state capital to Richmond left Williamsburg as something of
a backwater.52 Hopes for state assistance dimmed even further when, in 1786, Virginia enacted
the Statute for Religious Freedom, which prohibited all use of tax funds to subsidize religion.53
49

Id. at 34-35.

50

Historical Sketch, supra note 43, at 46-47; Kale, supra note 21, at 57-60; Rouse, supra

note 29, at 77-85. On extension of the surveyor’s office after the Revolution and
disestablishment, see The Rev. John Bracken v. The Visitors of Williams & Mary College, 3
Call. 573, 593 (1790) (discussion of surveyor’s office in John Marshall’s argument for the
college, appearing before the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, in lawsuit concerning the
powers of the college).
51

Rouse, supra note 29, at 79-80.

52

Kale, supra note 21, at 60.

53

The circumstances that led to this enactment are described in detail in the various

opinions in Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947). For additional detail on the effects of
disestablishment on the Anglican Church in Virginia, see generally David L. Holmes, The
16

Support from the church waned as well, in large part because of the end of royal support
for the established church in Virginia. In 1779, facing a continuing loss of revenue, Thomas
Jefferson – governor of Virginia, member of the board of visitors, and former student at the
college – proposed a radical revision of the college’s curriculum, which the visitors and faculty
largely accepted.54 The reform abolished the divinity school, and replaced those professorships
with ones in law and medicine. But the visitors rejected Jefferson’s proposal to make the college
a state institution.55 The course in medicine did not last long, although the lectures in law
provided a financial mainstay for the institution until the Civil War.
The college retained its close ties with the Episcopal Church – the new name for the
Anglican church in the American republic – but that church was hardly thriving in the years
following the revolution.56 Even before the war, Anglicanism had been overshadowed by the
Decline and Revival of the Church of Virginia, in Up from Independence: The Episcopal Church
in Virginia, ed. The Interdiocesan Bicentennial Committee of the Virginias (1976), 45-109.
54

Marsden, supra note 24, at 70; Tyler, supra note 42, at 6-8. See also David L. Holmes,

The Faiths of the Founding Fathers (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), at 85; Kale,
supra note 21, at 57-59; Rouse, supra note 29, at 77-79.
55

Kale, supra note 21, at 59.

56

See Edward Lewis Goodwin, The Colonial Church in Virginia: With Biographical

Sketches of the First Six Bishops of the Diocese of Virginia (Milwaukee: Morehouse Publishing,
1927), at 141-44; Mark A. Noll, America’s God: From Jonathan Edwards to Abraham Lincoln
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), at 120-22 (on Anglicanism in America after the
Revolution). See generally Holmes, supra note 53.
17

rapid growth of Evangelical movements, such as the Baptists and Methodists, following the First
Great Awakening.57 As patriotic fervor grew, support for the royal church withered even more.
Few clergy could be gathered for meetings of the newly-organized Episcopal Diocese of
Virginia, though in 1790 they managed to elect Virginia’s first bishop, and chose the Rev. James
Madison, president of the College of William & Mary since 1777 and second-cousin of the more
famous Virginian.58 For the next twenty years, Madison held both the college presidency and the
office of bishop.
Although Madison was highly regarded, neither institution thrived during the period. At
Madison’s death in 1812, the college had only forty-four students, compared to three times that
number a half-century earlier.59 Just over a decade later, that number had dropped by another
half, down to twenty-one students in the college, and prospects for improvement looked bleak.60
Having failed to transform William & Mary into a secular state university, Jefferson founded a
new University of Virginia in Charlottesville (1825).61 Other religious denominations were also
57

Noll, supra note 56, at 120-22.

58
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establishing colleges in Virginia during this period, including the Presbyterians (HampdenSydney, 1783), Baptists (University of Richmond, 1830), and Methodists (Randolph Macon,
1830), further reducing the potential student pool for William & Mary.62
Notwithstanding this competition, enrollment at the college rebounded during the 1830s,
owing at least in part to the improving fortunes of the Episcopal Diocese in Virginia and the
leadership of Adam Empie, a renowned preacher who became college president in 1827, and
served until 1836.63 Empie restored the chapel and revived the practice of daily prayer before
classes.64 During and after Empie’s service, the college enjoyed a period of relative prosperity,
but sharp disagreements between the faculty and visitors in the mid-1840s led to suspension of
classes for the 1848-49 academic year, and the removal of all but one of the college faculty.65
The college reopened under the leadership of another prominent Episcopalian cleric, John Johns,
who was then serving as assistant to the Virginia bishop, and would later become the fourth
bishop of the Virginia diocese.66 Johns and his successor, Benjamin Ewell, managed to recruit a
new faculty and return enrollment to sustainable levels during the 1850s, but the college suffered
another serious blow in 1859, when the main building burned down.67
62

Marsden, supra note 24, at 70; Rouse, supra note 29, at 100.

63

Kale, supra note 21, at 74-76.

64

Rouse, supra note 29, at 102.

65

Id. at 114.

66

Kale, supra note 21, at 77-81.

67

Historical Sketch, supra note 43, at 54-56; Kale, supra note 21, at 82-85; Rouse, supra

note 29, at 121-22.
19

A new building, in an Italianate style quite different from the original, was quickly
erected.68 The college had scarcely resumed classes in 1860, however, before they were
suspended in 1861 at the commencement of the Civil War, which brought more hardship to the
college. In 1862, Union forces occupying the town burned the newly-constructed college
building, and it was not rebuilt until 1869.69 The college attempted to resume classes in the fall
of 1865, but the lack of a college building, coupled with perilous economic conditions in the
post-war South, led to another suspension of classes. Although the school reopened in 1869, it
continued to struggle with low enrollment, and suspended classes again in the fall of 1881, when
it had only a dozen students.70 The school remained closed until 1888.
The post-war years also brought about a subtle shift in the college’s relationship with the
Episcopal Church. After Bishop Johns, no cleric held the college presidency and few ordained
clergy served as professors, especially after the college’s reopening in 1888. Indeed, one
exception illustrates the shift. In 1892, the college hired Charles Edward Bishop to teach Greek
and French.71 Bishop was a Presbyterian minister and had been educated at European
universities. Those two aspects of his biography reflect parallels between William & Mary and
other Protestant colleges during the late 19th century. The model of scientific and objective
higher education drawn from European models permeated many institutions of higher education
68
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during the period.72 That model was hostile to more traditional or evangelical expression of
religious piety, but was compatible with the newly emergent liberal Protestant faith, which
emphasized its non-denominational character.73 A Presbyterian minister teaching at an
Episcopalian school would have seemed commonplace in this culture of non-denominational
Protestantism.
An excerpt from the college’s rules, taken from around 1875, provides the best
description of the school’s embrace of an inclusive Protestant faith. The rules required students
to attend daily prayers in the chapel, and church on Sundays.74 But the rules allowed students to
select the particular church they would attend.
All students are expected to attend church on Sunday morning. They may indulge
their religious preferences by choosing between the churches of the different
religious denominations in Williamsburg; which preference shall be made known
at the time of matriculation.75
By around 1900, even the daily chapel prayers had taken on a non-denominational cast, as clergy
from the churches in town were invited to lead on a rotating basis.76
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In 1888, the college reopened with a new source of funding and a new governance
structure.77 After several failed attempts, proponents of the institution secured partial state
funding as a teacher’s college, and these funds gave the governor the right to appoint ten
members of a new twenty-one member board of visitors. The funds gave new life to the college,
but the board soon divided between the newly-appointed state representatives and the successors
of the charter board, with each fighting for control over the college’s direction.78 The conflict
was finally resolved in 1906 when the state accepted full control over the institution. All of its
assets were transferred to the state, and the governor was granted power to appoint the new board
of visitors.79
Nevertheless the college’s relationship with the Episcopal Church, and especially with
Bruton Parish Church, did not end when the state assumed control of the institution.80 W.A.R.
Goodwin, a former rector of Bruton Parish, proved to be one of the most influential figures in the
development of the college. While at Bruton Parish from 1903-09, Goodwin raised funds for
and supervised the restoration of that church, a project that formed only part of his overall vision
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for restoring Williamsburg and the college.81 After serving a parish in New York, Goodwin
returned to Williamsburg in 1923, lured by President J.A.C. Chandler, who offered Goodwin a
teaching position at the college (in biblical literature and religious education), as well as a chance
to raise funds for the restoration and expansion of the college.82 Within a few years, Goodwin
had convinced John D. Rockefeller, Jr., to finance the restoration of the college’s original
buildings. Full restoration of the main building, renamed the Sir Christopher Wren Building,
was completed in 1931, and returned the structure as close as possible to a mid-18th century
appearance.83 Rockefeller’s involvement with Goodwin and the college projects ultimately led
to his decision to underwrite much of the restoration of Colonial Williamsburg, and thus created
the setting upon which the college draws for much of its character.
The architects of the 1931 restoration gave the interior of the college chapel an
appearance consistent with mid-18th century Anglican parishes, except that the pews were
arranged perpendicular to the altar (as a choir, facing across the central aisle), in the manner of
English college chapels.84 The chancel is surrounded by a simple altar rail, within which is
81
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located the wooden communion table. The chapel, paneled in dark wood, is adorned with
plaques commemorating those who are buried under the chapel, along with the royal coat of
arms (of Georgian vintage).85
Sometime between 1938 and 1940, Bruton Parish donated its altar cross to the Wren
Chapel, because the parish received a new altar cross after undergoing substantial renovations.86
The cross donated by Bruton Parish had originally been given to the church in 1907, after the
Goodwin-led restoration, in memory of John and Sara Ann Millington.87 John Millington had
been a professor of chemistry and engineering at the college during the 1830s, as well as a
vestryman at Bruton Parish. From the time that it was donated by Bruton Parish until the fall of
2006, the Wren Chapel cross remained on the chapel altar, except when the chapel was used for
secular events, non-Christian religious services, or when those who used the chapel specifically
requested its removal.88
To summarize – the College of William & Mary has over its history metamorphosed
from a royal institution, chartered by the British crown, to a private institution under the control
of the Episcopal Diocese of Virginia, to an institution wholly owned and operated by the state of
Virginia since early in the 20th century. The College chapel has existed since the school’s royal
85
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phase, but was restored in the 20th century – after the onset of full state control – in an
architectural style consistent with 18th century Anglican churches. Soon after that restoration,
Bruton Parish transferred the cross to the college for use in that chapel. To complete the relevant
chronology, the Supreme Court – a decade after that transfer – ruled that the Establishment
Clause of the First Amendment was incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment and therefore
applied to the states.89

III. The Establishment Clause and Constitutional Injury
In a message explaining the decision to remove the Wren Chapel cross, President Nichol
wrote that permanent display of the cross treated non-Christian students as outsiders in the
college community.90 Such treatment, he argued, was inconsistent with the school’s
commitment to diversity and its identity as a public institution.91 Opponents criticized the
decision as political correctness run amok. The college had no obligation, they argued, to protect
the sensibilities of those who might be offended by seeing a cross displayed in a chapel,
especially because no one was required to attend events in the chapel, and the cross could be
removed on request for specific events.92
The dispute between supporters and opponents of Nichol’s decision masks a deeper
conceptual agreement between the parties about the purpose of the prohibition on government
89
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establishment of religion. Both sides focus on individual injury as the harm against which the
prohibition is directed, although the sides have very different ideas about what injuries are
cognizable.
The focus on harm or injury to individuals is understandable, but is underinclusive to the
point of being misleading as a normative account of the Establishment Clause. The concern
about personal injuries is primarily an artifact of Article III,93 which requires the presence of a
live “case” or “controversy” as a predicate of adjudication in the federal courts.94 Under the
Court’s long-standing jurisprudence of Article III, a plaintiff must have suffered a personal
injury, caused by a violation of the law and redressable by judicial remedy, in order to invoke the
jurisdiction of the federal courts.95 The Supreme Court’s most recent encounter with the Clause,
in Hein v. Freedom from Religion Foundation, Inc.,96 in which the Court rejected the asserted
standing of federal taxpayers to complain of executive expenditures in support of the President’s
Faith-Based and Community Initiative, has served to reinforce this injury-driven view of the
Establishment Clause.
By focusing on the Establishment Clause as a protection for individuals, however,
participants in the Wren Chapel cross controversy overlooked a fundamental aspect of the clause
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– its character as a jurisdictional limitation on the authority of government over religion,97 a
limitation that exists whether or not anyone is personally injured within the meaning of Article
III by a particular transgression. The parties are hardly alone in this oversight, but a better
appreciation of the Establishment Clause as a jurisdictional limitation on government would
bring much-needed clarity.
President Nichol’s defense of his decision to remove the Wren Chapel cross consistently,
although implicitly, invoked an understanding of Establishment Clause jurisprudence first
articulated by Justice O’Connor (who, by coincidence, serves as Chancellor of William & Mary).
In a message to the Board of Visitors, Nichols said:
[T]he display of a Christian cross -- the most potent symbol of my own religion in
the heart of our most important building -- sends an unmistakable message that
the chapel belongs more fully to some of us than to others. That there are, at the
college, insiders and outsiders. Those for whom our most revered place is meant
to be keenly welcoming, and those for whom presence is only tolerated.
...
97
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That distinction, I believe to be contrary to the best values of the college.98
This description of the injury caused by display of the cross closely tracks O’Connor’s
definition of government messages that represent unconstitutional endorsements of religion.
Concurring in Lynch v. Donnelly, O’Connor wrote:
Endorsement sends a message to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full
members of the political community, and an accompanying message to adherents
that they are insiders, favored members of the political community. Disapproval
sends the opposite message.99
The government engages in impermissible endorsement, Justice O’Connor explained, if it
intends to communicate a message of religious inclusion or exclusion, or if a reasonable observer
would understand the message as one of religious inclusion or exclusion, whether or not the
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government intended that meaning.100
Justice O’Connor’s endorsement-based theory can be understood in a number of ways,
but one recent and prominent elaboration of the approach suggests that it protects individuals
against the experience of official disparagement based on religion.101 According to this view, the
importance of religious belief for individual identity makes people especially vulnerable to such
disparagement.102 A message of religious disparagement is thus similar to one of racial
disparagement; both imply the subordination and exclusion of the demeaned individual or
group.103
Those who opposed the decision to remove the cross disputed Nichol’s claim that its
permanent display caused cognizable injury to non-Christians. If offense to someone’s personal
religious sensibilities is the measure of a particular symbol’s unlawfulness, critics argued, any
public religious display, however innocuous, is subject to challenge and removal. A number of
100
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critics asked why the altar, or even the Wren Chapel itself, should not also be removed, as either
might generate offense to the non-religious. The endorsement test, wrote Newt Gingrich and
Christopher Levenick, “leads to the rule of the perpetually aggrieved, a tyranny of the easily
offended.”104
Instead of highlighting a hypothetical person’s experience of offense, Nichol’s opponents
claimed, scrutiny of religious displays should focus on the actual experience of compulsion or
exclusion. No one had complained of being barred from using the chapel or required to attend a
function at which the cross was present.105 Under this theory of harm, the absence of proof of
such coercion – or even the realistic threat that coercion might be exercised in the future – meant
that Nichol lacked a good reason for ordering removal of the cross.
Like Nichol, those who opposed removal of the cross invoked a theory of the
Establishment Clause that has a respectable pedigree. Dissenting in part in County of Allegheny
v. ACLU, Justice Kennedy argued that personal compulsion is a necessary element of
government establishment of religion.106 Such coercion may take a variety of forms, including
104
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compelled religious observance, state sponsorship of religious observances in public schools,
taxation for the support of religious ministries, or “governmental exhortation to religiosity that
amounts in fact to proselytizing.”107 If coercion is not present, however, government displays of
religion pose a significantly diminished risk of harm to Establishment Clause values. “This is
most evident where the government's act of recognition or accommodation is passive and
symbolic, for in that instance any intangible benefit to religion is unlikely to present a realistic
risk of establishment.”108 Under this theory, permanent display of the Wren Chapel cross would
cause no material harm because the display is merely “passive and symbolic” rather than
coercive.
A still narrower theory of the relevant constitutional injury focuses on the concept of
legal coercion, which has been at the center of the view of the Establishment Clause advanced by
Justices Scalia and Thomas. Dissenting in Lee v. Weisman,109 which held government
sponsored prayers at middle school commencement to be unconstitutional, Justice Scalia insisted
that coercion backed by legal penalty was a necessary element of a violation of the Clause.110
in part). For a scholar’s presentation of this coercion-based view of the Clause, see Michael W.
McConnell, Coercion: The Lost Element of Establishment, 27 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 933 (1986).
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Because Ms. Weisman and the other students were under no such coercive threat – no legal
consequence would befall them if they refused to attend graduation or refused to stand during
recitation of the prayer – Justice Scalia concluded that the government’s role in sponsoring the
recitation of the prayer did not run afoul of the Establishment Clause.111
The deeper, jurisprudential debate over the meaning of injury under the Establishment
Clause has taken on a special importance in the wake of the Supreme Court’s decision in Hein v.
Freedom from Religion Foundation.112 Hein involved an Establishment Clause challenge to
conferences promoting the Faith-Based and Community Initiative (FBCI), held by the White
House Office of Faith-Based and Community Initiatives and several executive branch
agencies.113 The plaintiffs alleged that the conferences violated the Establishment Clause by
endorsing and promoting religion.114 The government moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing
that the plaintiffs lacked standing to bring the lawsuit. Citing Flast v. Cohen,115 the plaintiffs
asserted that they were injured as taxpayers because the conferences were funded with revenues
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generated by taxation.116 Although taxpayers as such normally do not have standing to challenge
the constitutionality of government expenditures,117 Flast created an exception for suits brought
under the Establishment Clause.118 The government argued that the court should limit
application of Flast to expenditures that have been specifically authorized by Congress, and the
FBCI conferences lacked such authorization.119 Instead, they were financed out of general
appropriations to the White House and agencies.
The district court agreed with the government, and dismissed the complaint for lack of
standing.120 On appeal, the Seventh Circuit reversed, ruling that the plaintiffs did have standing
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under Flast.121 The Supreme Court granted certiorari, and a sharply divided Court reversed the
Seventh Circuit, reinstating the district court’s dismissal of the complaint for lack of standing.122
No opinion commanded a majority of the Court in Hein. Although the various opinions
of the Justices principally focus on the meaning and continued viability of Flast, the deeper
disagreement among the contending positions arises from rival concepts of injury under the
Establishment Clause. The three justices who joined Justice Alito’s plurality opinion,
announcing the Court’s judgment, declined to overrule Flast, although their opinion hardly
provided a ringing endorsement of taxpayer standing in Establishment Clause cases.123 The
plurality said that resolution of the dispute in Hein did not require the Court to reconsider Flast,
because the earlier case considered only the injury to taxpayers from specific legislative
appropriations for religion, and the plaintiffs in Hein were not injured by congressional action.124
Flast, the plurality concluded, did not compel recognition of taxpayer injury from discretionary
expenditures by executive branch agencies.125 Of the five justices in the majority, only two
121
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(Scalia and Thomas) thought Flast should be overruled because a taxpayer does not suffer
distinct individual injury when public funds are used for religious purposes, regardless of which
branch has authorized the expenditures.126
The four justices in dissent rejected the distinction drawn by the plurality, and argued that
taxpayers suffered the same injury from specific congressional appropriations as from
discretionary expenditures by the executive.127 Flast, the dissent asserted, recognized the unique
character of injury suffered by the consciences of taxpayers who are compelled to provide funds
used by the government to support religion.128 That injury is the same whether it is inflicted by
legislators or executive branch officials, so taxpayers should have standing to sue without regard
to the branch of government primarily responsible for the challenged expenditure.129
Hein addressed injury to taxpayers, but the Court’s restrictive interpretation of the
relationship between Article III and the Establishment Clause suggests similar limitations might
apply to other types of Establishment Clause injury, particularly the harm asserted by those who
observe government religious displays. One month after the Court decided Hein, the Fifth
Circuit, acting en banc, ruled that a plaintiff had failed to offer sufficient proof of his standing to
challenge the constitutionality of officially-sponsored prayers at school board meetings. In Doe
v. Tangipahoa Parish School District,130 the full Fifth Circuit vacated a decision of a panel of the
126

127 S.Ct. at 2573-84 (Scalia, J., joined by Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment).

127

Id. at 2584-2588 (Souter, J., joined by Breyer, Ginsburg, and Stevens, JJ., dissenting).

128

Id. at 2585-86.

129

Id. at 2584-86.

130

494 F.3d 494 (5th Cir. 2007) (en banc).
35

court,131 which had recognized the plaintiff’s standing to sue based on his allegation that he had
attended the meetings and hadr been offended by prayers offered at them. The school board had
not challenged the plaintiff’s standing, and the district court had not addressed the issue, but the
appellate court panel determined that the board had impliedly admitted the plaintiff’s attendance
and injury.132 By a vote of eight to seven, however, the full Fifth Circuit held that an implied
admission by the defendant is insufficient to establish standing; the court remanded the case with
instructions to dismiss.133
Concurring in the en banc ruling,134 Judge DeMoss would have gone even further, and
rejected observer standing regardless of the proof offered by plaintiff that he had attended
meetings and been offended by board-sponsored sectarian prayers. Citing Hein, DeMoss argued
that mere exposure to a government-sponsored religious message inflicts no more particularized
injury on the observer than does compulsion of a taxpayer for support of religion.135 Because the
plaintiff voluntarily attended the school board meetings, DeMoss reasoned, plaintiffs has
“established only a general grievance indistinguishable from the one that any other non-attendee
citizen could have.”136
However explicable the focus on individual injury may be for purposes of satisfying the
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requirements of Article III, such a focus unfortunately diverts attention away from debate about
the substantive meaning and scope of the Establishment Clause. Those who advocate a narrower
concept of injury under the Establishment Clause typically do so in order to advance a narrower
reading of the clause itself; likewise, those who propose a broader understanding of injury do so
to promote a broader reach of the clause. When the debate focuses on individual injury,
however, the disputants can do little more than assert that religious conscience is or is not
peculiarly vulnerable to harm by government promotion or support of religion. One side argues
that people should be protected from exposure to religiously offensive acts or messages of the
government, while the other argues that people should only be protected against governmental
coercion in religious matters.
Neither argument, however, directly engages the normative content of the Establishment
Clause, independent of Article III concerns. Proponents of more robust protection for religious
conscience need to explain how that quality of mind differs from non-religious conscience, and
why the government is specially limited in conduct that may affect religious sensibilities.137
Those who believe coercion is a necessary element of an Establishment Clause violation need to
137
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explain why their position does not render the clause redundant, because virtually all
governmental acts of religious coercion would also violate the Free Exercise rights of those
coerced.138
Both sides have plausible responses to these questions, and these responses open the
possibility of more fruitful debate about the meaning and application of the clause. Some have
based their arguments about the distinctive quality of religious experience on the heightened risk
of conflict over religious differences,139 others on the danger of religious discrimination posed
when government becomes involved in religious matters,140 others on the transcendent character
of religious obligations,141 and still others from a more general concern with nurturing an
environment in which religion can flourish.142
In our own work, we have discussed and critiqued these views, and offered our own
138
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(Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment); Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 717-29
(2002) (Breyer, J., dissenting). For a critique of the anti-divisiveness view, see Richard W.
Garnett, Religion, Division, and the First Amendment, 94 Geo. L.J. 1666 (2006).
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approach to the central question. We have argued that Establishment Clause jurisprudence
should proceed from an understanding of the state as an institution with limited jurisdiction.143
That limitation arises from the idea of liberal government as secular or temporal – concerned
exclusively with matters of this age, and not with care for the spiritual welfare of its citizens.
This theory of the limitation has much in common with the idea of the constitutional right
of privacy. The zone of privacy and the zone of spirituality both mark out a domain from which
state supervision is excluded. Under this jurisdictional approach, government violates the
Establishment Clause when it asserts competence to proclaim the truth value of religious
messages, to resolve disputed religious questions, or to subsidize religious activities.
Nevertheless, the jurisdictional limitation does not map neatly on to the Jeffersonian
“wall of separation” between church and state.144 Civil government and religious institutions
share many areas of mutual temporal concern, including education and social welfare, and may
cooperate in addressing those concerns without unduly involving the state in religious activity.
This jurisdictional approach to Establishment Clause theory also recognizes circumstances under
which government may finance religious organizations or communicate messages that have
religious content.
The Wren Chapel cross controversy provides an especially illuminating context for
exploring such circumstances. The dispute over personal injury to those offended has tended to
143
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obscure deeper questions about the extent to which government may accommodate the religious
practices of college students, or acknowledge the religious history of the college and religious
beliefs of those in the college community. It is those questions – raised at William & Mary
entirely outside the constraining context of Article III, requirements of personal injury, and the
specialized rules of federal court adjudication – which President Nichol and his critics have been
implicitly addressing in the controversy over the Wren Chapel cross.
We believe that the conversation about the Wren Chapel cross can be enriched
considerably by turning away from this narrow focus on injury, and widening the discourse to
include more comprehensive theories of the Establishment Clause. In the remainder of this
article, we explore some of those theories and their implications for the controversy at the
College of William & Mary.

IV. Accommodation of Religion in Public Higher Education
Some who objected to removal of the Wren Chapel cross argued that the decision injured
the religious welfare of Christian students by stripping the chapel of its spiritual identity.145 This
145

See Leach v. Nichol, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38763 (E.D. Va., May 29, 2007),

affirmed, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 27857 (4th Cir., Dec. 3, 2007); Matthew D. Staver, Cross of
William and Mary, campusreportonline.net (Dec. 5, 2006), available at
http://www.campusreportonline.net/main/articles.php?id=1372. Both Leach and Staver claimed
that removal of the cross injures the religious liberty of Christians; the same claim has been
raised in connection with removal of a cross from permanent display in a Veterans Affairs
hospital chapel in North Carolina. Laura Arenschield, Lawyer takes on VA chapel neutrality,
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argument rests on the unstated premise that the college is justified in setting apart space – in a
publicly owned facility – for religious activity. Identifying the source of that justification, at
least in constitutional terms, is something of a challenge. Other state-sponsored chapels and
chaplaincy programs offer the most useful analogies. The military, prisons, and government
healthcare facilities have long supported chaplaincies, and those contexts have given rise to some
relevant Establishment Clause law.146 But the presence of chapels and chaplaincies in higher
education has received surprisingly scant legal attention.147
The Fayetteville Observer, Nov. 29, 2007.
146

Katcoff v. Marsh, 755 F.2d 223 (2nd Cir. 1985) (rejecting Establishment Clause

challenge to Army chaplaincy); Carter v. Broadlawns Medical Center, 857 F.2d 448 (8th Cir.
1988) (rejecting Establishment Clause challenge to hospital chaplaincy program); Malyon v.
Pierce County, 131 Wn.2d 779, 935 P.2d 1272 (1997) (holding that chaplain of sheriff’s
department did not violate federal or state prohibitions on aid to religion); Freedom from
Religion Foundation v. Nicholson, 469 F.Supp.2d 609 (W.D. Wis. 2007) (dismissing
Establishment Clause challenge to chaplaincy program in Veterans Affairs healthcare system).
We offer a general framework for analysis of government-sponsored chaplaincies in Ira C. Lupu
and Robert W. Tuttle, Instruments of Accommodation: the Military Chaplaincy and the
Constitution, 110 W. Va. L. Rev. 89 (2007).
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At the time William & Mary became a state institution in 1907, most public universities
had chapels, and many required students to attend daily services.148 The content of chapel
services reflected the non-denominational Protestant “establishment” that had prevailed at most
universities since the mid-nineteenth century.149 For a variety of reasons – most unrelated to the
law – mandatory chapel attendance policies were in steep decline by the 1920s and seem to have
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disappeared by the early 1940s.150 Voluntary chapel programs continued, some led by chaplains
employed by the university, and others by volunteers or campus ministers paid by religious
organizations.151
In the years following the Second World War, developments in Establishment Clause law
did have a significant impact on the policies of public universities toward religion. In 1947, the
Supreme Court first applied the clause to the states in Everson v. Board of Education,152 but the
most important developments followed in 1962 and 1963, when the Court struck down prayer
and bible reading in public schools. Although those decisions, Engel v. Vitale153 and School
District of Abington Township v. Schempp,154 involved primary and secondary education, public
university administrators understood that the decisions had significance for their institutions.155
This was principally true with respect to the place of religion in the curriculum, and involved
debates about the composition of religious studies departments and the content of courses taught
by such departments.156 The Court’s mandated “separation of church and state” spelled the end
of the last vestiges of religious establishment in public universities. Religion faculties composed
150
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of Protestant seminary graduates – teaching liberal Protestant interpretation of scripture, history,
and doctrine – gradually gave way in public institutions to a more pluralistic and detached study
of world religions.157
During the 1960s and 1970s, the separationist impulse also seems to have brought about,
or at least coincided with, a change in public university attitudes toward religion on campus. In
addition to the termination of most paid state university chaplaincies,158 victims of budgetary and
constitutional concerns, this period also witnessed adoption of a surprisingly radical response to
constitutional principles of separationism. Some state university administrators believed that the
Court’s Establishment Clause rulings required the schools to ban student religious groups from
all use of public facilities, even if the facilities were available for use by non-religious student
groups. The provision of campus facilities for use by religious groups, these administrators
asserted, represented impermissible public subsidy for religion.159
157

Id. at 223-34

158

Goplerud, supra note XX, at 5; Robert L. Johnson, Ministry in Secular Colleges and

Universities, in the Church's Ministry in Higher Education 219 (John H. Westerhoff ed., 1978).
See generally, George William Jones, The Public University and Religious Practice: an Inquiry
into University Provision for Campus Religious Life (Muncie, Ind: Ball State University, 1973).
159

See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 265 & n.3 (1981) (regulations of university that

barred use of campus facilities “for purposes of religious worship or religious teaching by either
student or nonstudent groups”). Widmar v. Vincent, Brief Amicus Curiae of Center for
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In Widmar v. Vincent,160 a religious student group at the University of Missouri-Kansas
City (UMKC) challenged such a policy, claiming that exclusion of the group from campus
facilities violated the students’ rights under the Free Exercise and Free Speech Clauses. UMKC
argued that the policy was required by the Establishment Clause, but the Supreme Court
disagreed. By an 8-1 vote, the Court held that UMKC’s policy was unconstitutional because the
prohibition on religious use, including worship, amounted to content-based regulation of
speech.161 In making university facilities available for general use by student groups, the Court
reasoned, UMKC created a public forum for student groups, and thus could not discriminate in
granting access to the forum based on the content of groups’ speech. Religious student groups
were entitled to use the facilities on an equal basis with non-religious student groups.162
The Court rejected UMKC’s Establishment Clause defense, holding that the grant of
equal access to a religious group does not make the university responsible for the religious
content of the group’s message.163 Because UMKC permitted any student group to use the
facilities, and there was no reason to believe that only religious groups would take advantage of
that opportunity, the Court said that the university’s policy did not represent improper aid to
ministries from campus facilities).
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religion. Instead, equal access to campus facilities more closely resembles other benefits, such
as police or fire protection, generally distributed to all persons and groups in a community.164
Just over a decade later, the Court extended the principles of Widmar to another case
involving religious activities at state universities. In Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the
University of Virginia,165 a religious student group sued when the University of Virginia (UVA)
rejected the group’s request for a subsidy that UVA provided to other eligible student groups.
The subsidy, which was derived from mandatory student activity fees, financed printing costs for
student group publications. A Christian student organization, Wide Awake, sought the printing
subsidy for its magazine, and UVA denied the request because of the organization’s religious
character and the religious content of the magazine.166
The group sued, alleging that UVA’s denial of the printing subsidy violated their rights
under the Free Speech, Free Exercise, and Equal Protection Clauses. Citing Widmar, Wide
Awake claimed that the printing subsidy constituted a limited public forum, and, by excluding
religious groups, UVA had imposed an impermissible content-based restriction on access to that
forum.167 UVA asserted that the Establishment Clause prohibited the university from
subsidizing the costs of printing a religious publication,168 and the Fourth Circuit agreed. But the
164
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Supreme Court reversed, with a 5-4 majority ruling that availability of the printing subsidy was
indistinguishable from the access to physical facilities of the school at issue in Widmar.169
Taken together, Widmar and Rosenberger define the equality-based minimum that public
universities must provide for student religious life. To the extent that resources and
opportunities are available for non-religious student groups and activities, the same must be
available for relevantly similar religious student groups and activities. Thus, if student groups
are generally eligible to reserve classrooms, use university photocopiers or distribution networks,
or receive reimbursement for costs of bringing speakers to campus, then the religious character
of some student groups should not disqualify them from receiving such benefits.170 Widmar and
Rosenberger thus establish equality as the floor: student religious activity on campus must not be
disfavored as compared to relevantly similar non-religious student activity.
The controversy over the Wren Chapel cross, however, does not have the same
did not aggressively advance that justification before the Court, and instead focused its argument
on the need for governmental discretion in spending, and the collateral implications of a ruling in
favor of Wide Awake. Id. at 833-38. UVA lost in Rosenberger, but the Court’s subsequent
decision in Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712 (2004), suggests that the Court was mindful of the
concerns raised by the university in Rosenberger.
169
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constitutional character as the issues presented in Widmar and Rosenberger. President Nichol’s
decision to move the cross did not involve exclusion of religious groups from campus or the
denial of equal benefits to religious student organizations. Instead, the controversy implicated
what may be thought of as the ceiling – the upper constitutional limit – of public university
support for student religious life. At what point would such support constitute an impermissible
establishment of religion?
The answer to that question can be found in the idea of religious accommodation, which
has been a feature of Establishment Clause jurisprudence since the Court’s decision in Zorach v.
Clauson.171 Zorach involved a New York program under which parents could arrange to have
171
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Accommodation and Equal Liberty, 42 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1007 (2001); Michael W.
McConnell, Accommodation of Religion: An Update and a Response to the Critics, 60 Geo.
Wash. L. Rev. 685 (1992); Steven G. Gey, Why Is Religion Special?: Reconsidering the
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Rev. 75 (1990); Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of Religion, 1985 Sup. Ct. Rev. 1.
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their children released from public school in order to attend religious instruction during the
school day.172 The students who did not attend religious classes remained at school for that
period. The plaintiffs challenged the program as a violation of the Establishment Clause, arguing
that the program impermissibly involved public schools – and the power of compulsory
education – in the enterprise of religious instruction.173 In an opinion written by Justice Douglas,
a 6-3 majority ruled that the program did not violate the Establishment Clause. Under the
released-time program, the Court held, “the public schools do no more than accommodate their
schedules to a program of outside religious instruction.”174 The public schools did not require
students to attend, supervise the teachers, determine the content of instruction, or even provide
the facilities.175 The accommodation, the Court reasoned, merely responded to the request of
parents by opening space in the school day for voluntary religious education.176
In dissent, Justices Black, Frankfurter, and Jackson identified concerns that would
eventually become central to the concept of accommodation. The dissenters argued that normal
school hours left plenty of time for religious instruction, so parents had little need for the
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accommodation.177 Moreover, they highlighted the program’s impact on non-participating
students, who were required to remain at school during the period of religious instruction.178
These features, they claimed, strongly suggested that the program promoted religious education –
and penalized those who declined to participate – rather than relieving any discernible burden on
religious exercise.179
The seeds of the accommodation doctrine planted in the Zorach dissents germinated in a
series of cases decided during the mid-1980s – Wallace v. Jaffree,180 Estate of Thornton v.
Caldor,181 Corp. of the Presiding Bishop v. Amos,182 and Texas Monthly v. Bullock.183 Wallace
177
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on the ideas advanced in the Zorach dissenting opinions. Sch. Dist. of Abington Township v.
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 294-305 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring). Supporters of bible reading
in public schools had argued that the practice accommodated the religious preferences of many
parents, but Brennan argued that the practice could not be justified as an accommodation. Id. at
294-96 (Brennan, J., concurring). Public schooling did not impede students’ access to religious
experience, and moreover, the alleged accommodation was provided to all students, not just to
those who specifically requested the experience. Id. at 297-99 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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involved a challenge to an Alabama statute that provided for a moment of silence “for meditation
or voluntary prayer” at the beginning of the public school day.184 In Caldor, employers
challenged a Connecticut statute that required them to accommodate employees’ requests for
Sabbath observance.185 In Amos, the Court considered an amendment to federal civil rights law
that exempted religious organizations from prohibitions on religion-based employment
discrimination.186 Texas Monthly involved a challenge to the exemption of religious publications
from a state sales tax imposed on other publications.187
Although the cases arose in quite varied factual contexts, a single thread runs through the
decisions. In all of them, the plaintiffs alleged that the government had violated the
Establishment Clause, and the government defended by arguing that the challenged practice was
a permissible accommodation of religion. The Court’s holdings in these cases, amplified in two
additional decisions over the last twenty years,188 generate four consistent criteria for
determining whether an accommodation violates the Establishment Clause.189 First, the
accommodation must relieve a government-imposed burden on religious exercise. Second, no
184
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one may be compelled to participate in the accommodated religious activity, and the content of
that activity must be determined by private actors, not by government agents. Third, the
accommodation must be available on an equal basis to all faiths. And fourth, the
accommodation must not impose significant hardships on third parties. We provide a brief
description of each criterion, and then suggest how it might be applied to both the Wren Chapel
and cross.
1. Response to burden on religion
The first criterion provides the distinguishing characteristic of religious accommodations
– the state acts to relieve a burden on religion caused by official policies or practices. But if no
such burden exists, then the accommodation is unwarranted.190 In both Texas Monthly and
Wallace, the Court used this criterion to strike down the purported accommodation. The Court
held that the sales tax at issue in Texas Monthly did not impose a burden peculiar to religion;
religious publications subjected to the tax would have been burdened in exactly the same manner
as non-religious publications.191 Thus, the Court held, exemption of religious publications
conferred on them an impermissible benefit. In Wallace, the Court found that public school
students were not materially burdened in their opportunity to exercise silent prayer, because a
previous moment-of-silence statute (which did not specifically mention prayer) already set aside
the time for meditation at the beginning of school.192
In contrast, the Court upheld the accommodation in Amos because it found that religious
190
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employers were especially burdened by the statutory prohibition on religious discrimination,
even though the prior version of the civil rights act exempted some positions from coverage.193
Religious organizations, the Court declared, had a unique interest in preferring employees of
their own faith, and the previous exemption allowed the organizations to exercise that preference
only with respect to positions that involved religious duties.194 Although the Court expressed the
view that the original, narrower, exemption may have been sufficient to avoid a violation of such
employers’ Free Exercise rights, the Establishment Clause did not forbid the government to
extend broader protection than the constitution’s minimum requirement.195 Indeed, the Court
found, application of the earlier exemption had chilled religious organizations’ exercise of the
protection, because it had required them to anticipate which positions would be treated as
sufficiently religious to be exempted from anti-discrimination law and had led to litigation over
the exemption’s boundaries.196 The broader exemption, the Court concluded, was appropriately
responsive to this burden on religious exercise.
At first glance, the Wren Chapel and cross appear to be significantly different from the
accommodations challenged in Wallace, Caldor, Amos, and Texas Monthly. Amos and Texas
Monthly addressed negative accommodations – that is, the government merely declined to extend
a particular regulation to the protected religious practice.197 Even Wallace and Caldor would
193
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have required only limited government interaction with the accommodation. The moment-ofsilence provision needed only the teacher to announce the meditation period, while the protection
for Sabbath observance in Caldor depended on private employers’ compliance with the statutory
mandate, enforced only upon complaint by particular employees.198 The Wren Chapel and cross,
however, involve affirmative acts in support of religion, and thus have more in common with the
religious accommodations found in the military, prisons, and government healthcare facilities.
In such settings, the government finances religious ministries – including clergy salaries, places
of worship, religious instruction, and pastoral care – for the sake of those under the care or
control of the institution.199
Nevertheless, these affirmative accommodations can be measured against the same
standard as regulatory exemptions – is the government’s assistance to religion responsive to a
government-imposed burden? Prison chaplaincy programs easily meet that test because
incarceration isolates prisoners from their religious communities, and the government’s control
over the movement, assembly, visitation, and activity of prisoners can severely limit prisoners’
opportunity to practice their faith.200 Those who serve in the military suffer similar burdens on
2000e-1); Texas Monthly, 489 U.S. at 5 (exemption from Texas state sales tax, Tex. Tax Code
Ann. § 151.312 (1982)).
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their exercise of religion, along with personal and familial stresses that are unique to the
demands of military life.201 Thus, the military chaplaincy also meets the standard of
responsiveness to a government-imposed burden. Hospital in-patients may be similarly deprived
of ordinary access to religious experience, at a time when patients may be especially in need of
religious counseling or comfort.202
Public higher education lacks most of the characteristics that justify accommodations in
the military, prisons, and healthcare facilities. College students are not physically confined by
the government, typically have access to faith communities outside the college, and are free to
gather on or off campus for religious purposes. The college imposes no direct obstacle to
students’ exercise of religion.203 This suggests, at minimum, that public universities will be
more limited than the military, prisons, or hospitals in their legal authority to provide affirmative
religious services for students. For example, public universities would find it difficult to justify
F.3d 844, 850 n.10 (8th Cir. 1997); Theriault v. Silber, 547 F.2d 1279 (5th Cir. 1977).
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employment of full-time chaplains.204 Unlike the military and prisons, colleges do not have the
concerns about security that justify restriction of access to service members and inmates, and
thus do not have the same need for a cadre of screened and trained ministers who can be trusted
in especially sensitive or dangerous areas. Nor do colleges share healthcare facilities’ need to
fully integrate pastoral care into the institutions’ respective services.
Even if the circumstances of college life are insufficient to warrant a full-time chaplaincy
program, student experience may present a more subtle and indirect burden on the full realization
of student religious choices, and this burden should justify some degree of religious
accommodation. Many universities attempt to create a comprehensive community for students,
one that stretches beyond the basics of education, shelter and food. To enhance students’
experience of college life, schools provide opportunities for entertainment, arts, athletics,

204
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http://www.siouxcityjournal.com/articles/2007/07/26/news/latest_news/fdac39adc2e1a8ef86257
3240044f747.txt.
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socializing, and even self-governance. Most universities also provide healthcare, counseling,
and police protection. Considered separately, those services or activities are unremarkable; but
taken together, they present a self-sufficient community. Omission of religious interests from
that community would impose a modest obstacle to student religious experience, if only in the
requirement that students exit from the community constituted by the college in order to
participate in religious life.205
To address that obstacle, public universities should be permitted to accommodate student
religious needs by facilitating opportunities for worship or other religious experience. Many
universities do this through a campus religious life coordinator, who typically screens and
registers religious groups that want to work with students, supports such groups with
administrative resources (photocopying, scheduling rooms, etc.), and helps the groups to
publicize their campus activities.206 The coordinator’s position fits comfortably within the
standards for religious accommodation because it responds directly to students’ interest in
finding a place for religious life within the school’s comprehensive community.
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Colleges can justify maintenance of a designated chapel in much the same way that they
can justify the religious coordinator’s position. The chapel offers a physical locus for religious
life within the campus community. It provides a place for campus religious groups to worship,
equipped with commonly-used resources (such as a piano or organ), as well as a place set apart
for private meditation. And the chapel does so in the context of a campus that is typically filled
with structures that serve the widest range of other student needs, as described above. The
constitutional questions about public university chapels thus should not focus on the existence of
such facilities, but rather – as we discuss below – on the configuration and policies for their use.
Of course, the dispute at William & Mary involved not the general availability of a
chapel, but the display of a specific religious symbol within a particular chapel. Compared with
provision of a chapel or religious life coordinator, permanent display of a particular faith’s
religious symbol might not appear to be elicited by any burden whatsoever on student religious
exercise. If students in fact desire to worship in a faith-specific environment, provision of the
necessary artifacts of that environment may be responsive to circumstances of relative isolation
and physical convenience. Accordingly, temporary provision of religious materials and symbols
such as icons and other items used in worship may be constitutionally appropriate.207 Permanent
display of the cross or any other symbol of a specific faith, however, is quite vulnerable on the
second and third criteria, analyzed below, concerning religious equality and government
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selection of religious content.
2. Voluntary participation, private religious content
The second criterion serves as a corollary of the initial requirement of government
responsiveness to private religious need. Government may fairly be said to have accommodated
religion only if participation in the resulting religious activity is voluntary, and the content of that
activity is selected by the participants rather than the government. Conversely, if the government
mandates participation or determines the content of the religious activity, the activity takes on
the character of government promotion, rather than facilitation, of religious experience. The
concept of accommodation has long emphasized this distinction between promoting state
religion and facilitating private religious experience. Concurring in Abington Township v.
Schempp, Justice Brennan argued that the practice of daily prayer and Bible reading in public
schools could not be defended as an accommodation because the students did not elect to attend
the classes or choose the religious experience they would receive.208 And in Wallace v. Jaffree,
Justice O’Connor said that the challenged moment-of-silence provision was not an
accommodation, because the legislation at issue attempted to specify prayer as a governmentapproved way for students to use the time, as compared to an earlier and still-valid statute that
simply created a time for students to use as they saw fit.209 By urging students to pray, the state
moved from accommodating to promoting religion.
Mandatory chapel attendance policies at a public university would fail under this second

208

374 U.S. 203, 299-300 (Brennan, J., concurring).

209

472 U.S. 38, 67-79 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
59

criterion, as would any other required program of religious instruction or observance.210 But
public universities are very unlikely to return to compulsory religious activity, so the more
relevant part of the second criterion is the requirement that the content of accommodated
religious activity must be privately chosen. In other words, the government may provide the
opportunity for religious experience, but it may not decide how that opportunity will be used.
That choice belongs to the accommodation’s beneficiaries.
The distinction between facilitating and promoting faith applies readily to the role of
coordinator for religious life. As long as the coordinator acts as a liaison between students and
religious groups, offering each the opportunity to make contact with the other, then the university
is fairly deemed to be accommodating students’ faith experience. If, however, the coordinator
were to steer students toward a particular group, then the university would be asserting an
interest in the content of students’ religious experience – an interest that is fundamentally
incompatible with the idea of accommodation.
Chapels offer a more difficult setting in which to frame the distinction between
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policy at military academies violates the Establishment Clause); Mellon v. Bunting, 327 F.3d
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accommodation and promotion of religion. Unlike a moment of silence, which can be filled with
each student’s thoughts of any kind, a designated chapel will ordinarily represent someone’s
substantive idea of space that is appropriate for religious experience. For example, the
configuration of the Wren Chapel reflects the ideas of 17th century Anglicans about scripture and
sacrament, minister and congregation.211 Of course, universities may choose to provide separate
chapels for all major faith groups, so each can worship in a setting that embodies its tradition.212
But scarcity of resources and other problems of administration point to the option of one, allinclusive chapel. If a school, like William & Mary, has only one chapel, must its architecture be
stripped of all marks that connect it to a particular religious tradition?
The restriction on government-supplied religious content does not require such drastic
measures. Instead, the relevant question is whether the chapel’s configuration limits its use to
that of a particular faith, or whether the architecture and furnishings are capable of being used by
all faiths. We recognize that, for reasons of belief, some faith groups might not worship in

211

Davis and Rawlings, supra note XX, at 12-19; Henne, supra note XX; Upton, supra

note XX, at 47-55.
212

The military academies have multiple chapels, but very few other schools have more

than a single facility. See State University Survey, conducted by savethewrencross.org (copy on
file with authors and law review). For military academy chapels, see
http://www.usafa.af.mil/superintendent/pa/factsheets/chapel.htm (Air Force Academy);
http://www.usma.edu/Chaplain/chapels.htm (West Point);
http://www.usna.edu/Chaplains/services.htm (Naval Academy).
61

facilities used at other times by other religious communities. But a particular faith tradition’s
need to worship in space used only by that group does not undermine the formal openness of the
chapel’s worship space for use by all faiths. The needs of that faith tradition, not the design of
the chapel or restrictions imposed by the government, would be the cause of that group’s
inability to use the chapel.
The Wren Chapel provides an especially good illustration of this point. The front of the
chapel includes an altar, pulpit, lectern, and chancel rail.213 For those versed in church history
and architecture, the arrangement and decoration of these fixtures express a particularly
Protestant era of Anglicanism.214 The wooden table – not a traditional altar – highlights the
significance of Eucharist as a communal meal rather than a repetition of Christ’s sacrifice.215
The low chancel rail, compared to a medieval rood screen, dramatically reduces the distance
between the congregation and minister.216 The placement of pulpit and lectern signifies the
relative importance of scripture and preaching, and reduces the emphasis on liturgy.217 As others
have observed, these architectural emphases carry an implicit historical and theological message
of anti-Catholicism, rejecting the Roman church’s teachings on the priesthood, the sacraments,
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and the means of salvation.218
That rich theological and architectural significance, however, does not mean that the
government has impermissibly provided the religious content of an accommodation. First, as we
develop in the next part, the configuration of the Wren Chapel can be traced to a source other
than the government’s desire to promote a particular faith tradition.219 The configuration is
based on the 18th century origin of the Wren Chapel, which links the chapel to other historic recreations within the Wren Building and in the adjacent Colonial Williamsburg, all of which
attempt to replicate mid-18th century appearance.220 Second, and more important for the current
inquiry, the configuration of the Wren Chapel does not superimpose the content or experience of
Christian worship on others who use the facility. Instead, the fixtures are capable of use for
virtually any religious content. The texts of any tradition can be read from the lectern or pulpit,
and the religious objects of any faith can be placed on the altar-table. We do not imply here that
the physical trappings of Protestant worship represent a religious norm – even the ‘lowest
common denominator’ among Christians, as many 19th century liberal Protestants asserted.
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Rather, our claim is only that the chapel can serve as a multi-faith accommodation of student
(rather than government) choice of religious conduct. The space, although rich in theological
meaning, does not express a unique fitness for Christian worship.
But permanent display of the cross on the altar of the Wren Chapel is an entirely different
matter. Unlike the chapel’s communion table or the pulpit, permanent display of the cross on the
altar cannot readily be harmonized with non-Christian use of the space. The right of students to
request removal of the cross does not ameliorate the problem, because the defect rests in the
government’s decision about the content of the accommodation, not in the voluntary choice of
individuals to participate in the accommodation.221 By selecting Christianity as the default faith
of the chapel, the college departed from the role as facilitator of student religious experience, and
undertook responsibility for determining the presumptive content of that experience.
Imagine, for an analogical example, that all students entering the school were assumed to
be Episcopalian unless they specifically informed the religious life coordinator that they had a
different religious preference. The coordinator then invited all students – except those who
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specified otherwise – to Episcopalian events, and arranged for Episcopalian campus ministers to
have access to all non-objecting students. Such a practice obviously violates the requirement of
religious neutrality, discussed below, but it also violates the government’s obligation not to
choose the religious content of an accommodation. By so choosing, the government asserts its
jurisdictional competence over the life of faith, and such an assertion represents a core violation
of the Establishment Clause, whether or not any student suffers a personal injury within the
meaning of Article III.
The story would be considerably more complicated if the cross had been a permanent
architectural feature of the chapel, affixed to or carved in a wall, or portrayed in a stained-glass
window. If so, the college would have had plausible reasons for declining to remove the
religious symbol between Christian worship services,222 although a sanctuary that is pervasively
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decorated with images of a particular faith may ultimately prove unsuitable as a multi-faith
chapel. But because the Wren Chapel cross was easily moved from the altar, a decision not to
withdraw the symbol from that place of prominence would make the government responsible for
selecting that symbol as the present-day default religious orientation of the chapel.
3. Religious neutrality
To survive constitutional scrutiny, an accommodation must be formally available to all
faiths. This requirement of religious equality embodies the core of most contemporary
Establishment Clause theories.223 Nearly all treat neutrality as a necessary feature, and some
regard equal treatment of faiths as sufficient to comply with the demands of the clause. Most of
the Court’s accommodation decisions identify neutrality as an element of the constitutional
analysis, but the question of equality proved central in Board of Education of Kiryas Joel v.
Grumet.224 In Kiryas Joel, the Court struck down a special school district that the State of New
York had created for the Village of Kiryas Joel, which is comprised almost entirely of members
of the Satmar Hasidic religious community.225 The Court held that creation of the school district

223

For discussion of various theories that embody some concept of neutrality, see

Douglas Laycock, Substantive Neutrality Revisited, 110 W.Va. L. Rev. 51 (2007).
224

512 U.S. 687 (1994).

225

Id. at 696. For criticism of the Court’s opinion in Kiryas Joel, see Thomas C. Berg,

Slouching Toward Secularism: A Comment on Kiryas Joel School District v. Grumet, 44 Emory
L.J. 433 (1995); Abner Greene, Kiryas Joel and Two Mistakes About Equality, 96 Colum. L.
Rev. 1 (1996).
66

violated the Establishment Clause because the benefit of such a district was not generally
available to other religious groups, and the needs of the Satmar Hasidim could have been met
without recourse to the special preference.226
Religious accommodations in a public university should satisfy the requirement of
neutrality as long as the school grants access and distributes resources according to nondiscriminatory criteria. For example, allocation of worship space and time should be based upon
criteria that permit all groups to compete equally for advantageous slots, although the relative
size of groups and intra-faith heterogeneity may be legitimate considerations.227 If the religious
life coordinator serves as a gatekeeper, any decisions should be based on clear and published
policies applicable to all faiths (and biased against none), explaining the basis for any adverse
action, and providing a reasonable opportunity to appeal.
The requirement of religious neutrality also applies to the configuration of chapels.
Regulations governing the use and appearance of military chapels reflect this obligation. The
rules provide that:
(1) All distinctive faith groups represented in the command may use these
facilities on a space available basis.
...
(4) The chapel environment will be religiously neutral when the facility is not
being used for scheduled worship.
(5) Chapels must be available to people of all faith groups for meditation and
226
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prayer when formal religious services are not scheduled.228
As we discussed in the previous section, configuration of a chapel is likely to reflect
culture-bound assumptions about religious experience. Even something as seemingly innocuous
as the permanent installation of pews embodies such an assumption, as illustrated by the fact that
some faith traditions do not use seating during worship.229 Although the government should take
such considerations into account in constructing new worship facilities, the failure to do so in the
past does not mean that the government has violated the requirement of neutrality. As long as
the worship space is available for use by all faiths, the government will have met its obligation.
But availability demands more than mere eligibility; it means that a faith group may use the
chapel without having the religious messages of another tradition superimposed on their own
worship. At a minimum, this means that the government must remove or provide some way of
covering any faith-specific symbols or messages during worship by other faith traditions.
Seen in this light, the Wren Chapel generally satisfies the standard of neutrality.
Although the architecture and fixtures belong to a particular religious tradition, and manifest
theological commitments of that tradition, such manifestations do not materially impede other
groups’ use of the space. The table and lectern are equally available for use, without regard to
the worship materials or religious texts placed on them. Indeed, even the chapel’s consecration
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as an Anglican place of worship does not deprive other faiths of their equal opportunity to use
the space. Any faith tradition could similarly conduct a ritual to sanctify the space for its own
worship. Any attempt to block such rituals in the name of protecting a prior faith’s consecration
would violate the requirement of neutrality.230
Under this criterion, permanent display of the cross on the Wren Chapel altar fails the
standard of neutrality for a religious accommodation. In the context of a chapel actively used by
a variety of faiths, permanent display of the cross suggests that Christianity is the favored or
even official religion, while other faiths are merely tolerated. Toleration, however, is
fundamentally different from accommodation. In a regime of toleration, the government
supports a particular faith and permits other faiths to worship freely. In a regime of
accommodation, the government provides equal support for the free religious exercise of all its
citizens, and remains indifferent to the content, success, or historic position of any particular
faith.
4. Burdens on third parties
The final criterion requires attention to any hardship an accommodation might impose on
third parties, although it is unlikely to be a significant element in consideration of public
universities’ support for student religious experience. The Court invoked this criterion in Caldor
when it struck down a rule that protected employees’ Sabbath observance;231 the Court held that
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the rule extended the protection without appropriately considering the costs that employers and
fellow employees would be required to bear in order to provide for such observance.232 In Cutter
v. Wilkinson,233 the Court returned to this theme when it held that the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) should be interpreted to provide adequate protection for
the security interests of prison guards and fellow inmates.234
The religious accommodations at issue on public university campuses do not pose the
serious risk of hardship or personal injury at issue in Caldor and Cutter. Indeed, if an
accommodation is implemented consistently with the first three criteria, it would be hard to
imagine anyone experiencing a burden that would be reasonably attributable to the
accommodation. The accommodation merely creates an equal opportunity for voluntary
religious experience within the campus community. Those who do not want to participate in the
offered religious experience are free to exercise that choice, without any pressure from school
officials. Those who want to participate in the activity have an equal right to use resources that
the school makes available for that purposes.

V. Acknowledgment of Religion
Contemporary Establishment Clause doctrine offers a second path for attempting to
justify permanent display of the Wren Chapel cross – the idea that the government does not
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violate the clause when it merely “acknowledges” religion. Although justices and commentators
have often used the terms “accommodation” and “acknowledgment” interchangeably,235 the two
refer to quite distinct practices and distinct theories of justification. The government
accommodates religion when it removes an identifiable, government-imposed burden in order to
facilitate someone’s religious exercise. Acknowledgment of religion has a less definite source
and limit, but it generally involves an official practice or message that has religious content and
serves a public purpose.236
The idea of acknowledgment has been an important theme in Establishment Clause
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jurisprudence since the early 1980s, when the Court relied on the idea in deciding two cases
involving religious expression by the government, Marsh v. Chambers237 and Lynch v.
Donnelly.238 In Marsh, the Court rejected an Establishment Clause challenge to the practice of
state-sponsored prayer in the Nebraska legislature,239 and in Lynch, the Court rejected a
challenge to the city of Pawtucket’s Christmas display.240 Chief Justice Burger wrote the
majority opinions in both cases, and he used a similar argument to uphold both practices. Burger
reasoned that the history of the Establishment Clause does not support a strict separation of
church and state.241 Instead, he asserted, that history reflects a pattern of official recognition of
religion’s significance, manifest in prayers before official events, presidential proclamations of
thanksgiving, official observance of holidays that are religiously significant, public display of
religious art, and references to religious ideas on the currency, in the national motto, and in the
Pledge of Allegiance.242 He summarized the argument in the claim that “[th]ere is an unbroken
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history of official acknowledgment by all three branches of government of the role of religion in
American life from at least 1789.”243
During the past quarter-century, the idea of acknowledgment has remained a central
theme in Establishment Clause jurisprudence, representing an alternative to separationist
constraints on official expression of religion. In County of Allegheny v. ACLU, Justice
Kennedy’s partial dissent relied on the idea of acknowledgment to argue for the constitutionality
of a creche display in the courthouse.244 Dissenting in Lee v. Weisman245 and McCreary County
v. ACLU of Kentucky,246 Justice Scalia also invoked the concept of acknowledgment. On both
occasions, Scalia reasoned that the Establishment Clause should not bar public acknowledgment,
through prayer or displays, of theistic beliefs because such beliefs were widely held among the
founders, and are still broadly shared among the nation’s citizens.247
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As we argue in this Part, the idea of acknowledgment is complex and ambiguous, but the
Wren Chapel cross offers an especially useful context for exploring the idea. Such an
exploration is especially important because those who invoke the concept of acknowledgment
are often unclear about its meaning or scope. Through this exploration, we identify three quite
distinct understandings of religious acknowledgment – historical accuracy, reverence, and
cultural recognition. We evaluate the constitutional premises underlying each concept of
acknowledgment, and we suggest how each would apply to permanent display of the chapel
cross.
1. Acknowledgment as historical accuracy
The first understanding of acknowledgment is the most restrictive and least controversial
of the three. Acknowledgment as historical accuracy represents the modest assertion that the
government may officially recognize the significance of religious groups, movements, and ideas
as a part of our cultural and national history.248 For example, the National Park Service, which
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maintains the Mormon Pioneer National Historic Trail, may explain why the pioneers were
emigrating.249 Such acknowledgments of religion involve descriptive rather than normative
claims about religion.
The sharpest illustration of this distinction arises in public schools, which are permitted
by the Constitution to teach about religion but forbidden to engage in religious inculcation.250
That distinction, however, sometimes proves elusive or difficult to administer. For example,
when some school systems have attempted to implement programs of instruction about religious
topics, the classes have been challenged over the content of the curriculum, based on allegations
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that the programs failed to maintain a consistently descriptive attitude toward the subject.251
More frequently, however, the programs have been challenged over the implementation of the
religion curriculum, as teachers redirected the courses to serve religious purposes.252 Thus, even
if it is uncontroversial as a matter of principle that government may acknowledge the historical
significance of religion, implementation of the principle – especially in public primary and
secondary schools – is likely to be more controversial because of the difficulty of controlling
those who provide the lessons about religion’s significance.
Even if government actors hew closely to the goal of religious description, issues may
arise concerning the accuracy of the purported acknowledgment. The government does not
establish religion when it offers a reasonable account of how religion affected past events. Of
course, that argument invites a host of further questions. These include philosophical questions
about what should count as truthful or reasonable accounts, as well as institutional concerns over
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which agency of government gets the final say in what counts as reasonably accurate. Answers
to these questions are closely related, because if one believes that historical accuracy is
unattainable, then one is also likely to believe that democratic institutions should have the final
word.253 If, however, one believes that statements about history can be falsified, then one might
also believe that courts should play a role in policing acknowledgments of religion.
For purposes of this paper, we assume that historical statements can be falsified, though
we confess uncertainty about the extent to which courts should defer to arguable but
unpersuasive historical claims.254 Debates over display of the Ten Commandments offer a useful
illustration. Proponents of such displays often argue that the displays acknowledge the
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intelligent design in public schools. Proponents of intelligent design assert that the theory
addresses scientific claims about weaknesses in Darwinian evolution, and thus should be
permitted in the public school science curriculum. Opponents argue that the theory of intelligent
design does not meet widely accepted criteria for science. Opponents have thus far prevailed in
court. See Kitzmiller v. Dover Area School District, 400 F.Supp.2d 707 (M.D. Pa. 2005)
(holding that inclusion of Intelligent Design theory in public school science curriculum violated
the Establishment Clause because the theory is religious, not scientific, in character).
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commandments’ role as the historical foundations of the common law.255 Many medieval and
early modern legal writers made the same assertion, although very few contemporary legal
historians would agree.256 Modern scholarship generally locates the roots of the common law
tradition in pre-Christian Anglo-Saxon sources.257 The persistence of historical claims in the
face of significant evidence to the contrary does suggest that the argument from history is a
pretext for normative claims about the importance of respecting and obeying the commandments.
As we discuss below, officials (and reviewing courts) often interweave descriptive
acknowledgments of religion with normative religious claims; in such cases, unpersuasive
descriptive assertions should be evaluated with a deeply skeptical eye.258
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Opponents of President Nichol’s decision to remove the Wren Chapel cross frequently
invoked the argument that permanent display of the cross represented an acknowledgment of
religion’s historical role at the college.259 The underlying basis for the claim is indisputable. As
we described in Part II, the college was largely founded for religious purposes and maintained its
identity as a church institution until at least the Civil War.260 But the argument fails to specify or
clarify the relationship between that history and permanent display of the cross on the chapel
altar.
The problem is not the age of the cross, because both the chapel interior and cross date
from roughly the same period, the 1930s. In the 1931 restoration of the Wren Building,
however, the chapel’s Victorian-era configuration was removed and replaced with the present
reproduction of mid-18th century design of worship space.261 The decision to replicate 18th
century design was not accidential or arbitrary.262 That era define the identities of both the
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College of William & Mary and the City of Williamsburg. Those identities find their
distinctiveness, and help attract students and tourists, by emphasizing the links among the town,
the college, and the nation’s founding generation.263
In a representation of an 18th century chapel, however, the altar cross is glaringly
anachronistic. Anglican churches of that era did not place crosses on the altar because they
viewed such adornments as remnants of Roman Catholicism.264 That belief continued well into

within the past hundred years” (emphasis in original). Henne, supra note XX. The claim is true
but highly misleading when applied in the context of the Wren Building and Chapel. A fivehundred-year-old building may be restored to a point representing only a century past, but no one
can reasonably believe that the Wren Chapel was restored to its appearance in 1940, 1900, or any
point subsequent to the 1859 fire that destroyed the colonial-era structure. If the chapel interior
had been configured to represent a Victorian or Edwardian Anglican worship space, then display
of the cross would have been historically appropriate. But the Wren Building and Chapel were
restored to reflect the colonial era, so the altar cross is not part of an historically accurate display.
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the 19th century, until the Oxford Movement led many Anglican congregations to adopt a more
ornamented style of worship.265 Instead of a cross, the altar of an 18th century Anglican church
would have been adorned with a communion plate and cup, often made of silver or gold.266
The anachronism undermines the purported intent to acknowledge the school’s religious
origins. Because the cross display is not an accurate representation of 18th century worship
space, the display communicates a different message – that the chapel is now a place set apart for
Christian worship, rather than simply that it was originally constructed for that purpose. Other
religiously distinctive symbols could have been justified as historical acknowledgments. For
example, churches of the period often had an altarpiece inscribed with the Decalogue or, as noted
above, displayed a communion plate and cup on the altar.267 But the altar cross lacks any
plausible connection to 18th century worship practice.
President Nichol did not defend his decision to remove the cross as a restoration of
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historic authenticity, and the defense seems only to have been identified by those responding to
opponents of that decision.268 But we are focused only on the legal reasons that would have
allowed the college to leave the cross on permanent display, not the reasons for its removal from
the altar. Permanent display of the cross lacks the historical accuracy required to be justified as
an acknowledgment under this first definition of that term.
2. Acknowledgment as reverence
The second interpretation of religious acknowledgment is far more controversial than the
first. The historical version of acknowledgment is descriptive, but acknowledgment as an
expression of reverence is not only normative but performative. It represents an act of worship
by the political community. The official act of acknowledgment is directed to God as a
collective recognition of divinity. This understanding is categorically different from
acknowledgment as a reflection of historical or cultural reference points. Those two focus
attention on religion as a human phenomenon, either in the past or present. In stark contrast,
acknowledgment as reverence constitutes participation in the intrinsically religious act of
worship.269
This reverential conception of religious acknowledgment has surfaced only recently in
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contemporary Establishment Clause jurisprudence, and has not yet commanded a majority of the
Court. Dissenting in McCreary County v. ACLU of Kentucky,270 Justice Scalia wrote:
“[h]istorical practices thus demonstrate that there is a distance between the acknowledgment of a
single Creator and the establishment of a religion.”271 Concurring in Van Orden v. Perry,272 he
made the point even more explicitly. “There is nothing unconstitutional,” Justice Scalia wrote,
“in a State's favoring religion generally, honoring God through public prayer and
acknowledgment, or, in a nonproselytizing manner, venerating the Ten Commandments.”273 For
Scalia, the people collectively – acting through their agent, the government – may properly
engage in worship of God.274
Scalia’s argument in McCreary County and Van Orden only makes explicit what had
long been an unstated implication of the term acknowledgment. Perhaps the earliest and best
example of this can be found in Justice Douglas’s opinion for the Court in Zorach v. Clauson,275
where he wrote that “[w]e are a religious people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme
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Being.”276 Justice Douglas’s assertion tracks Justice Scalia’s claim about acknowledgment in
three important respects. First, it links the people and government in a single religious identity.
Second, it suggests – albeit much more ambiguously than Justice Scalia does – a particular
religious attitude, which is implied by the term “presuppose.” It is possible that Justice Douglas
meant the term only as an historical claim about the importance of religion to the nation’s
founders, but his use of the present tense indicates that the presupposition is ongoing. In other
words, the Supreme Being remains, in some sense, at the foundation of the nation’s institutions.
Third, Justice Douglas’s statement identifies the object of that religious attitude in generically
monotheistic but nondenominational language.
As sketched in Justice Scalia’s McCreary County dissent and Van Orden concurrence,
the idea of acknowledgment as reverence would permit official expressions of support for
religion, public religious displays, and prayer before civic events.277 Justice Scalia derived his
understanding of permissible religious acknowledgment from a reading of Establishment Clause
history,278 and that history also provides the two limiting principles on his account of
acknowledgment. Such acknowledgments, he asserted, violate the Establishment Clause only if
individuals are compelled to participate in the communal religious activity,279 or if the activity
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involves religious claims that are narrower and more specific than the inclusive monotheism
embraced by the founders.280
Justice Scalia’s concept of acknowledgment has generated a vigorous reaction,281
primarily because his interpretation jettisoned the obligation of religious neutrality, which has
been the keystone of Establishment Clause jurisprudence since the Court’s decision in Board of
Education v. Everson282 inaugurated the modern era of that jurisprudence. On Justice Scalia’s
reading, the government has no obligation to be neutral between religion and non-religion, or
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even between monotheism and other religious traditions.283 The requirement of official
neutrality extends only to monotheist faiths.284 Government must not endorse or denigrate any
specific faith, but is otherwise free to support or engage in generically monotheist worship and
religious expression.
This understanding of reverential acknowledgment, however, is unlikely to be helpful to
those who support permanent display of the Wren Chapel cross. On a practical level, Justice
Scalia’s articulations of this idea in McCreary County and Van Orden were joined only by
Justice Thomas and Chief Justice Rehnquist.285 Justice Kennedy joined other parts of Justice
Scalia’s dissent in McCreary County, but not the portion containing the claims about the
permissibility of government-sponsored worship.286 Even if Chief Justice Roberts and Justice
Alito eventually chose to adopt the idea of reverential acknowledgment, Justice Kennedy’s
opposition would prevent it from gaining a majority of the present Court.
More importantly, display of the cross does not fall within Scalia’s definition of a
permissible acknowledgment because it represents a set of quite distinctive claims about the
person and work of God, rather than an inclusive recognition of the “Supreme Being.” Even
under Justice Scalia’s expansive concept of reverential acknowledgment, official recognition of
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Christianity’s distinctive symbol violates the Establishment Clause.
3. Acknowledgment as cultural recognition
The third potential understanding of acknowledgment is the most frequently used but also
the most complicated, largely because of its inherent ambiguity. Under the concept of cultural
recognition, the state may acknowledge the important role of religion within the social and
political community. In contrast to the historical version, cultural acknowledgment focuses on
the contemporary significance of religion. But the two versions are alike – and distinguishable
from the reverential account – in that they are both intended to be descriptive. The government
acknowledges religion, but does not itself engage in worship. The ambiguities of cultural
recognition arise from the frequent difficulties of separating the descriptive act of
acknowledgment from normative and reverential promotion by the government of religious
experience.
Chief Justice Burger’s opinion for the Court in Lynch v. Donnelly287 represents the most
prominent example of the cultural acknowledgment theory. The plaintiffs in Lynch challenged
the inclusion of a creche in a city-sponsored Christmas display. They argued that the creche was
a distinctly religious symbol, and the city’s embrace of that symbol reflected impermissible
government support for religion.288 In rejecting the challenge, the Court pointed to the history of
public recognition of religion,289 and focused particularly on longstanding practices related to
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religious holidays. For example, Presidents and Congress issue proclamations that
commemorate religious holidays, government closes its offices and gives its workers paid
vacations, and cities across the country erect displays to express public celebration of the holiday
season.290
The Establishment Clause does not prohibit official recognition of religion as long as the
act of recognition has a secular purpose, determined by each specific factual context.291 In
Lynch, the Court found such a purpose in the celebration of the Christmas holiday, which has
taken on an independent secular significance and thus become part of the broader culture.292
Within the broad context of a display celebrating this cultural holiday, the Court reasoned, the
city should be able to include a reference to the religious roots of the holiday.293
The reasoning in Lynch is easily mistaken for the historical version of acknowledgment,
or confused with the idea of accommodation, but it is a distinct approach. Under the historical
version, constitutional validity of the message depends on its accuracy. Thus, a National Park
Service plaque at Monticello could properly indicate that Thomas Jefferson donated funds to
churches, but not that Jefferson held traditional Christian beliefs about Jesus Christ.294 Under the
idea of accommodation, particular government-imposed burdens on religious exercise give rise
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to and justify the government’s support for religious experience. Under the cultural version of
acknowledgment, however, the government is neither bound by the requirement of historical
accuracy nor limited to relief of government-imposed burdens. Cultural acknowledgments
respond to the religious experiences and preferences of the populace, but response to popular
demand alone cannot justify the acknowledgment. If demand were sufficient, the government
would have virtually unlimited discretion to highlight and celebrate the religious beliefs of the
majority or politically influential.
Thus, in Lynch, the Court held that acknowledgments of religion must further a secular
purpose,295 independent of the reinforcement or affirmation of popular religious beliefs, although
the purpose of the acknowledgment need not be exclusively secular.296 Celebration of the
Christmas holiday, the Court reasoned, was a legitimate secular purpose because the holiday
possesses cultural and commercial aspects that have significance independent of the Christian
meaning or origins of the event.297 Moreover, the Court permitted the city to include within its
display a reference to the religious origins of the event. That reference – the creche – did not
transform the entire display into a religious message. Instead, the creche recognized the
contribution of religion to the overall cultural experience of the holiday.298
The idea of cultural acknowledgment in Lynch depends heavily on the logic developed
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earlier in McGowan v. Maryland,299 in which the Court rejected an Establishment Clause
challenge to a law that required most places of business to close on Sundays. The plaintiffs, who
had been charged with selling goods on Sunday, argued that the law was unconstitutional
because it was intended to encourage attendance at Christian churches.300 Although such laws
had religious origins, the Court reasoned that legislation requiring a uniform day of rest was
justified by its beneficial effect on social welfare.301 The choice of Sunday as the state’s
coordinated day of respite from business did not reflect a preference for Christianity, but a
recognition of the practice already adopted by a majority of the state’s citizens, including many
non-Christians.302 The Establishment Clause did not require the state to ignore existing and
widespread social practices when selecting the weekly day of rest.303 As in Lynch, the cultural
acknowledgment of religion was justified by a secular purpose that had significance independent
of and distinguishable from the religious content of the acknowledgment.304
Not all acts of alleged cultural recognition pass this test. In County of Allegheny v.
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ACLU,305 a splintered Supreme Court invalidated a display of a stand-alone Christmas creche on
the landing of a prominent staircase in the County Courthouse, but upheld the display of a
Christmas tree alongside a Chanukah menorah and peace sign outside the County municipal
building. The display of the creche alone, the Court ruled, celebrated the religious meaning of
the holiday and lacked connection to the day’s secular significance.306 In contrast, the
combination of multiple holiday symbols with a peace sign in the outdoor display was sufficient
for seven Justices to conclude that this arrangement recognized the cultural significance of the
holiday season for many in the Pittsburgh area.307
Similarly, the Court’s disposition of the Ten Commandments Cases,308 decided in 2005,
manifested precisely the same distinction between displays designed to recognize secular ideals
or aspects of culture, and displays designed to promote religious principles. In McCreary County
v. ACLU of Kentucky, a 5-4 majority parsed the history of the display of the Decalogue in the
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county courthouse and concluded that public officials had posted the document for the purpose
of celebrating its religious content.309 The majority saw the county officials’ attempt to
secularize the document, by surrounding it with other historical materials concerning the relation
of religion to law, as a pretext,310 rather than an authentic acknowledgment of the Ten
Commandments’ place in the secular culture.
On the same day, a different 5-4 alignment in the Supreme Court produced a decision in
Van Orden v. Perry311 upholding the display of the Ten Commandments on the Texas state
capitol grounds. In Van Orden, the plurality opinion recognized that the monument had been
accepted and prominently displayed by the state in reflection of the secular state purpose of
fighting juvenile delinquency through moral education.312 In addition to recognizing this secular
purpose, Justice Breyer’s decisive concurring opinion also emphasized the divisive quality of
removing a longstanding monument, to which many people in the community are attached for
cultural and religious reasons.313
However much one might question whether the factual differences between McCreary
County and Van Orden support the difference in result, the Ten Commandments cases sharply
reinforce the constitutional requirement that cultural acknowledgments of religious symbols or
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sentiments must credibly resonate with secular meaning and secular goals in order to satisfy the
Constitution. Moreover, as we suggest below, the concern for divisiveness in the response to
constitutionally questionable displays is a prominent aspect of the story at William & Mary.
The lower courts have proven capable of administering the distinctions demanded by the
theory of cultural acknowledgment. In Doe v. Village of Crestwood,314 for example, the Seventh
Circuit held unconstitutional a city’s practice of including Roman Catholic mass as part of its
festivals celebrating Polish and Italian heritage. Contrasting the mass with the creche at issue in
Lynch, the court found that celebration of the two cultures did not provide a sufficient secular
justification for city sponsorship of the worship service.315 Two features of the case
distinguished it from Lynch. First, the mass involved an overt act of worship, rather than just a
display of a religious symbol. Second, the mass lacked a significant secular connection with the
festival.316
These two considerations are conceptually linked. A government-supported act of
cultural acknowledgment that includes more explicit and robust religious activity, such as the
worship service challenged in Crestwood, should have a more obvious and substantial secular
justification than a passive display. In the absence of such a justification, the government’s
purported reasons for the acknowledgment may be, or are likely to appear to be, a pretext
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designed to cover up a reverential acknowledgment.
During the controversy over the Wren Chapel cross, the idea of cultural acknowledgment
surfaced through an argument offered to defend permanent display of the cross. Some opponents
of the President’s decision claimed that the pre-existing display of the cross commemorated the
long relationship between the college and Bruton Parish Church.317 This argument was
buttressed by the fact that the cross was originally donated to the church in memory of a 19th
century professor at William & Mary. At first glance, this claim resonates with the cultural
acknowledgment approach of McGowan and Lynch. Under this theory of permissible
acknowledgment, permanent display of the cross would be justified because it furthers the
secular purpose of symbolizing and celebrating the school’s substantial bonds with Bruton
Parish, bonds that include the many college presidents who served as rectors of that
congregation.
As was the case in Village of Crestwood, however, the argument falters at the connection
between the precise details of the religious acknowledgment and its purported secular purpose.
Permanent or default display of the cross on the chapel altar offered virtually no visual cues that
the college intended the cross to convey a message about the school’s links with Bruton Parish.
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Instead, the presentation indicated only that the chapel was presumptively a place of Christian
worship.
Recognition of the historic and ongoing relationship between the College and Bruton
Parish is a legitimate secular purpose, and the cross can be a constitutionally acceptable element
in conveying that recognition. In order to serve as cultural or historical acknowledgment,
however, the display must make the relationship between college and church more apparent, and
less an afterthought to what seemed to be the reverential purpose of the display. The
compromise placement of the cross, in an appropriately marked display case on the side wall of
the chapel, is a far more defensible acknowledgment of history and culture than the unadorned
placement on the altar. Moreover, leaving the cross within the chapel space, rather than
relegating it to a back room, helps ameliorate the potential divisiveness that proved decisive for
Justice Breyer (and thus to the outcome) in Van Orden v. Perry.318
Conclusion
The controversy over the presence and placement of the cross in the Wren Chapel is a
matter of local and collegial interest, but it also represents a spectacularly teachable moment.
As we hope this paper has demonstrated, resolution of the controversy implicates the deepest
questions of Establishment Clause jurisprudence. These questions include the increasingly
important relationship between concepts of justiciability and the substantive content of the
Clause, in part because President Nichol framed his decision in terms of offense to those who
have may been made to feel like religious outsiders by the default position of the cross on the
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chapel’s altar table.
Even when current doctrinal concerns about “personal injury” and “endorsement” are
pushed to one side, however, the presence of the cross in a prominent and highly visible location
in the chapel of a public college invites attention to the limits of public agencies’ authority to
speak in a religious voice. If the Establishment Clause means anything, it prohibits the
government from acting for the purposes of sponsorship and promotion of a particular faith
tradition. Whenever an agency of the government speaks in ways that connote such
sponsorship, it must offer some theory of justification independent of such an impermissible
purpose. In the circumstances present at William & Mary, a reflexive sense of “once a Christian
school, always a Christian school,” simply will not suffice as a constitutionally adequate
justification.
On the facts of the controversy at William & Mary, the only plausible candidates for a
theory of justification are concepts of “accommodation” and “acknowledgment.” The theory of
accommodation, which requires a government-imposed burden on religious freedom as a trigger,
can justify the provision of a college chapel, but it cannot justify a symbolic Christian
characterization of the space as its default configuration. By the same token, because the
absence or removal of that default configuration is no burden on religious liberty, the
compromise position of moving the cross off to one side, and permitting its display on the altar
only during Christian worship, cannot possibly be seen as producing any constitutional harm.
When Christian students need the cross on the altar to focus their worship, they can move the
cross to that place.
The theory of acknowledgment offers more possibilities to justify the prior placement of
96

the cross in the chapel, but none are sufficient. Historical accuracy is dissatisfied, not fulfilled,
by placement of the cross on the altar table, where it would not have been in the 18th century.
Reverential acknowledgment as a concept perhaps can do the trick, but such a concept has not
yet become part of our law, and in any event has not been stretched this far even by its most avid
judicial proponents. Indeed, reverential acknowledgment of a sectarian symbol seems to us
synonymous with an establishment of religion.
What remains is the concept of cultural acknowledgment. This idea has roots in the case
law, but its boundaries are amorphous and uncertain. Whatever those boundaries may be, the
combination of a permanent default position at the center of the chapel’s worship space, and the
unambiguous religiosity of the cross in this setting, make the Wren Cross a poor candidate for
the justification of cultural acknowledgment. Arguments based on culture seem a pretext for
reverence when the relevant icon starkly transmits the message of Christian passion and promise,
and the icon’s cultural background remains hidden from view.
We have no doubt that President Nichol could have been more thorough in the reasoning
that accompanied and followed his decision. If he had engaged in a more elaborate process of
constitutional evaluation, we expect that he would have come to the same conclusion. At a
public college, placement of a cross in such a position of spatial, ceremonial, and visual
prominence, could not continue without putting the school in violation of the Constitution.
In contrast, placing the cross off to one side of the chapel, in a display case marked with a
message about the role of this particular cross and of Bruton Parish in the chapel’s history,
seems to us to be a defensible act of both cultural and historical acknowledgment. This
compromise solution, while perhaps not fully satisfactory to the more ardent advocates on either
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side of the dispute, reflects appropriate sensitivity to the full panoply of constitutional, historical,
educational, and institutional considerations. We hope that the rich insights that can be drawn
from the struggle over the cross at college will endure long after adversarial tempers have
cooled.
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